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SUMMARY 
Fault tree analysis is a recently developed method of reliability 
analysis and is generally applicable to complex, dynamic systems which 
include nuclear reactor systems. Fault tree analysis offers a tool by 
which nuclear reactor systems may be optimized in design to achieve, 
within the limits of engineering capabilities, the dual requirements for 
maximum safety and plant availability and minimum cost and complexity. 
The influence of the application of formal reliability analysis to all 
nuclear plant systems will result in higher probability of the systems 
functioning properly when they are called upon to operate. The greatest 
need today, however, is in the area of nuclear safety systems. 
This dissertation provides a formal methodology, Synthetic Tree 
Model, for constructing fault trees for electrical systems to the point 
where identifiable primary component failures will directly produce the 
required fault events. Existing fault tree terminology is used in Syn-
thetic Tree Model. The resultant fault trees are in a conventional format 
and are, consequently, immediately compatible with presently used fault 
tree solution techniques. Actually, they differ from a conventionally 
constructed fault tree in few ways. A difference is that, should any 
number of analysts construct fault trees independently for a given system 
and main failure event, using Synthetic Tree Model, they will all obtain 
identical fault trees. This is not a characteristic of conventional fault 
tree construction. This dissertation offers a model of considerable 
xii 
importance since it puts forth a model that affords the opportunity to 
reduce the cost of and time required for a fault tree analysis as well as 
provides potential for a standard by which fault trees can be constructed 
or checked. 
Synthetic Tree Model is a synthesis technique for piecing together, 
with proper editing, a fault tree from small segments called component 
failure transfer functions. The component failure transfer functions are 
obtained from a system-independent failure mode analysis of individual 
components. This piecing together is an uncomplicated process but does 
involve "bookkeeping" such that the appropriate editing of the component 
failure transfer functions can be carried out. The component failure 
transfer functions are a limiting factor on the resolution of the fault 
trees resulting from Synthetic Tree Model. 
While automation of fault tree construction is possible in the 
framework of Synthetic Tree Model, a computer program; DRAFT, has been 
written to accomplish this for certain electrical systems, this automa-
tion formulates yet another distinct type of analysis. The automated 
construction has potential as an overall, summary-type analysis that can 
be routinely done in a relatively small amount of time. Automation of 
Synthetic Tree Model provides the fault tree analyst a valuable tool to 
complement his present skills while Synthetic Tree Model itself is imme-
diately applicable to manual fault tree construction with the advantages 
of this manual analysis. 
While Synthetic Tree Model is developed herein only for electri-
cal systems, its implications extend to all fault tree constructions. 
The model is purposely left "open ended" to allow for its extension. 
XI11 
Synthetic Tree Model shows potential for becoming a standard for fault 
tree construction as it is a formal approach to fault tree construction. 
The technique is of a general enough nature to allow fault tree construc-






Reliability analysis is a relatively new subject, continuously 
developing and expanding. Consequently its extent as a subject is not 
clearly defined. On one hand, it might be thought of as simply analysis 
to obtain statistical estimations of numerical reliability. On the other 
extreme, it might be thought of as analysis encompassing the whole develop-
ment program. In reality it is neither of these extremes, but rather is 
a set of analytical techniques generated by an attitude of anticipation 
of unreliability and an appreciation of the necessity of pre-planned elim-
ination of the associated problems. 
A commonly accepted definition of reliability is the following: 
"The reliability of a system is the probability that it will perform a re-
quired function under specified conditions, without failure, for a speci-
2 
fied period of time." As this definition implies, reliability prediction 
is based on detailed knowledge of system configuration, knowledge of the 
conditions of system use, and the failure characteristics of its components. 
Concepts and methods of reliability prediction have been continu-
ally developed and refined over the past decade, and now reliability pre-
diction is an important condition in the design of many systems such as 
3 
aircraft, ships and their electronic systems, missiles, and spacecraft. 
These systems are characterized by requirements for safety, predictable 
2 
mission success and minimum maintenance per operating hour--three attri-
butes that apply strongly to nuclear^reactor systems. 
Reliability, like several other important reactor parameters, for 
example the Departure from Nucleate Boiling ratio, is not a directly mea-
surable property of the system; it can be estimated only from other mea-
surable parameters. Reliability analysis methodology offers a tool by 
which nuclear reactor systems may be optimized in design to achieve, 
within the limits of engineering capabilities, the dual requirements for 
maximum safety and plant availability and minimum cost and complexity. 
The influence of the application of formal reliability analysis to all 
nuclear plant systems will result in higher probability of the systems 
functioning properly when they are called upon to operate. The greatest 
need today, however, is in the area of nuclear safety systems. 
Formal reliability methods do not evaluate a system's capability to 
meet the functional requirements for which it was designed. Rather, re-
liability prediction methods establish the relative probability of the 
system performing adequately for the period intended under the operating 
conditions specified. The capability of the system to adequately meet 
the design function is not a part of the reliability analysis, but rather 
is the design adequacy. For example, the ability of a pump to deliver a 
given flow rate is a measure of its design adequacy. The probability of 
the pump functioning at some future time is its reliability. 
1.1.1 System Structure Models 
In the development of relevant system structure models, the concern 
is not with failure rates or distribution functions; rather, it should be 
3 
focused on an adequate logical description of all events that must occur 
4 
to cause system failure. An adequate logical description can be derived 
only if the functional design, physical layout, and method of operation 
of a system are known. 
Approximations to reality can be achieved with probability models 
derived from reliability block diagrams. Basically, block diagram models 
are probabilistic statements of component and part combinations necessary 
to achieve satisfactory operation. The sophistication or realism in block 
diagram models can vary greatly from simple part-count models modified to 
reflect redundancy to computerized programs that consider dependency, re-
dundancy, and time sequencing in system operation by defining a system in 
terms of functions and components essential to the functions. Block dia-
gram models allow consideration of redundancy, are well suited to available 
data and system descriptions, and provide some capability to handle 
.dependency. 
The complexity of the more sophisticated block diagram models, sug-
gests a more logical approach to the development of reactor system proba-
bilistic models. In effect what is required is a definition of all event 
sequences that give rise to the failure event or events of interest. In 
this approach a system logic model is developed that is addressed solely 
to the failure of interest; for example, the maximum credible accident 
and how this failure might develop. Such an approach does not require 
assumptions about independence in redundancy. It is solely based on the 
physical design and functional description of a system. Fault tree analy-
sis is the method used to develop system failure logic. In this approach 
4 
an undesired event is defined. This event must be real and measurable. 
Subsequently the subevehts necessary to cause the undesired event are de-
.•••i;-rsfe-"-::.-.,'v 
veloped in a graphical display by using various logic gates; for example, 
AND or OR gates. The appeal of fault tree analysis is that it simulates 
the critical aspects of system failure behavior as closely as possible 
without construction of the real system. Other advantages of system logic 
models are that they account for redundancy, repair, interdependence, and 
second order failures. Second order failures are failures induced by 
interaction of the component with the results of other component's fail-
ures. For example, if a relay fails in a valve actuation system, it is 
possible to observe the direct effect of the failure, as well as the ef-
fect of failures that may be induced in other parts of the system such 
as improper valve sequencing and false system status information. Also 
an unusual failure mode in one component may be examined for its effect, 
if it occurs, on the other similar components in the system. 
1.1.2 Fault Tree Analysis 
Fault tree analysis provides an all inclusive, versatile mathe-
matical tool for analyzing complex systems. Its application can include 
a complete plant as well as any of the systems and subsystems. Fault tree 
analysis provides an objective basis for analyzing system design, perform-
ing trade-off studies, analyzing common mode failures, demonstrating com-
pliance with Atomic Energy Commission requirements, and justifying system 
changes or additions. 
The logic of the approach makes it a visibility tool for both en-
gineering and management. Conventional reliability analysis techniques 
5 
are inductive in nature and are primarily concerned with assuring that 
hardware will reliably accomplish its #ssi,gned functions. The fault tree 
method is concerned with assuring that all critical activities are iden-
tified and eliminated or controlled. 
In 1961 the concept of fault tree analysis was originated by Bell 
Telephone Laboratories as a technique with which to perform a safety 
D 
evaluation of the Minuteman Launch Control System. At the 1965 Safety 
Symposium, sponsored by the University of Washington and the Boeing Com-
pany, several papers were presented that expounded the virtues of fault 
9 
tree analysis. The presentation of these papers marked the beginning of 
a widespread interest in the possibility of using fault tree analysis as 
a reliability tool in the nuclear reactor industry. In the early 1970's 
great strides were made in the solution of fault trees to obtain complete 
i- u-i-- • * 4̂ u ^ i fc- i i ^ 10,11,12,13,14 reliability information about relatively complex systems. 
The collection and evaluation of failure data is still of the utmost im-
portar.ce.7>15>16>17 
Main benefits of fault tree analysis include: 
1. Directing the analyst to ferret out failures in a deductive way 
2. Pointing out the aspects of the system important in respect to 
the failure of interest. 
3. Providing a graphical aid giving system management visibility 
to those removed from the system design changes. 
4. Providing options for qualitative or quantitative system re-
liability analysis. 
5. Allowing the analyst to concentrate on one particular system 
at a time. 
6 
6. Providing the analyst with genuine insight into system behavior. 
Fault tree models do have disadvantages. Probably the most out-
3 
standing is the cost of development in first time application to a system. 
As in the development of engineering drawings for a nuclear reactor sys-
tem, the cost is somewhat offset by future application of the models in 
accident prevention and system modifications. Another possible disadvan-
tage is that the validity of the model is controlled by the skill and 
thoroughness of the analyst. This is true of all safety analysis work. 
Fault tree analysis is a sophisticated form of reliability analysis 
and is consequently relatively expensive. The additional expense is 
justified by detail of the qualitative or quantitative analysis resulting 
from fault tree analysis. Another aspect of fault tree analysis that 
limits its application at this time is the relatively small number of 
18 
people skilled in the techniques of fault tree analysis. Even skilled 
personnel might develop a fault tree for a given system in different ways. 
The worst pitfalls that can confront one unskilled in performing 
19 fault tree analysis is over-sight and omission. Significant omissions 
sometimes occur if the analyst jumps ahead two or more logical levels in 
his development of a deductive chain of factors and causes. For example, 
he may skip from initiation of a command to its acceptance, and neglect 
transmission. The tendency for this to happen is minimized if one follows 
S: 
the rule of listing very direct, immediate causes of any factor considered 
before going on to consider the next lower level of causes. 
While certain single failures that can result in several component 
failures simultaneously, common mode failures, can be pointed out by a 
7 
detailed fault tree analysis, the analyst must be alert to include other 
common mode failures properly in the fault tree. At any rate, the analyst 
should be aware that fault tree analysis does not inherently ferret out 
common mode failures. 
1.2 Objectives 
The objective of this thesis is to present a formal methodology 
for fault tree construction. A method formal enough to allow automated 
hardware-oriented fault tree construction for certain electrical systems 
as examples is sought, with its implications extending to fault tree con-
struction in general, neglecting secondary failures. The methodology, 
called Synthetic Tree Model (STM), is to be "open ended" to allow for its 
extension to various types of systems and to allow increased resolution 
of the resultant fault trees. 
The fault trees resulting from Synthetic Tree Model are to be in 
conventional format, use conventional symbols, and are to be constructed 
beginning with the main fault event of interest and proceeding to the in-
dividual component failure as is done in conventional fault tree construc-
tion. Actually, they should differ from a conventionally constructed 
fault tree in few ways. A main difference should be that should any num-
ber of analysts construct fault trees independently for a given system 
and main failure event using Synthetic Tree Model, they will all obtain 
identical fault trees. This is not a characteristic of conventional fault 
tree construction. 
Being a formal methodology, Synthetic Tree Model is to offer poten-
tial as a standard for fault tree construction. The technique is to be 
8 
of a general enough nature to allow fault tree construction for systems 
both in the nuclear industry and ^sewhere. 
1.3 Importance of the Study 
Fault tree analysis has become of considerable importance as a tool 
of safety and reliability analysis in the nuclear industry. Much has been 
published dealing with developing techniques to quantify existing fault 
trees during the past decade while little has been published dealing with 
the construction of the fault tree itself. There is no published formal 
model for fault tree construction other than Synthetic Tree Model as pre-
sented herein. Other techniques for fault tree construction depend on 
the analyst ferreting out system logic, a technique that has the advantage 
of insuring that the analyst obtains a detailed knowledge of the sys-
1 7 8 19 
tem. ' ' ' A major disadvantage of fault tree analysis has been the 
large amount of time required to develop the fault tree itself. This 
thesis offers a method of considerable importance since it presents a 
model that affords the opportunity to reduce the cost of and time required 
for a fault tree analysis as well as provides potential for a standard 
by which fault trees can be evaluated and checked. 
1.4 Limitations 
While all the objectives were obtained for Synthetic Tree Model, 
there are certain limitations. The method does not account for secondary 
failures--that is, failure related feedback between components is ignored. 
This is not a limitation of fault tree analysis but only of Synthetic 
Tree Model. The fault trees are constructed to the point where identifi-
able primary component failures will directly produce the fault event in 
9 
question. 
Synthetic Tree Model provides the basis for totally automated 
reliability prediction. Automated analysis should be thought of as a dis 
tinct type of analysis that could never replace conventional fault tree 
analysis. This automated tool could stop the system analyst from think-
ing. A value of the fault tree technique is that the analyst is forced 
to truly understand the system. Many weaknesses are typically corrected 
while constructing the fault tree. A value of the technique is the con-
struction process, as well as the tree itself and resulting probability 
numbers. The automated analysis presented herein is a hardware oriented 
approach that does not include environmental and human effects that can 
cause failures and, therefore, is apart from an in-depth fault tree 
analysis. 
Some systems may not lend themselves to analysis using Synthetic 
Tree Model since it may not be possible to determine certain necessary 
parameters for these systems. Indeed, there is no guarantee that a suf-
ficient set of these parameters can be determined for systems other than 
the types presented in this thesis. 
1.5 Method of Approach 
Synthetic Tree Model is a synthesis method for constructing fault 
trees from small segments called component failure transfer functions. 
The component failure transfer functions are obtained from a system-
independent analysis of every component appearing in the system for which 
the fault tree is to be constructed. Once the component failure transfer 
m m 
10 
functions are obtained, they may be used repeatedly, without modification, 
for any other system in which the component appears. 
The system is defined by its associated schematic diagram and by 
system boundary conditions. The system boundary conditions give the main 
failure of interest, the one for which the fault tree is to be drawn, and 
also define the configurations of the components that have more than one 
operating state in the "non-failed" system. These boundary conditions 
along with other boundary conditions generated during the fault tree con-
struction itself provide a basis for editing the failure transfer func-
tions as they are connected into the fault trees. 
The component failure transfer functions, inter-correlation be-
tween boundary condition and fault events, and several other parameters 
are catalogued as library data and are thereby available to the analyst 
or computer. '•• 
Basic concepts and definitions of Synthetic Tree Model are pre-
sented in Chapter II. Conventional fault tree terminology is presented 
in Chapter III. Details about basic parameters of Synthetic Tree Model 
are provided in Chapter IV, while the synthesis and editing processes are 
described in Chapter V. Chapter VI provides an example demonstrating 
Synthetic Tree Model. A complete, automated reliability prediction is 
then given in Chapter VII demonstrating the role of Synthetic Tree Model. 
Appendix C presents a computer constructed fault tree for a reactor scram 
system using Synthetic Tree Model. 
11 
CHAPTER II 
CONCEPTS OF SYNTHETIC TREE MODEL 
Synthetic Tree Model is a formal methodology for constructing 
fault trees for electrical systems to the point where identifiable primary 
component failures will directly produce the required fault events. Syn-
thetic Tree Model (STM) is unique in that it is formal enough to have per-
mitted automated fault tree construction for certain electrical systems. 
While STM is developed herein only for electrical systems, its implica-
tions, extend to all fault tree construction. 
STM is a synthesis technique for piecing together, with proper 
editing, a fault tree from small segments called component failure trans-
fer functions. These component failure transfer functions are obtained 
from a system-independent failure mode analysis of individual components. 
Failure mode analysis is identifying all possible means by which a com-
ponent can fail to perform its required functions. In some cases failure 
mode analysis has included not only the systematic identification of all 
the mechanisms of each mode of failure, but also assessing the probability 
of occurrence of these mechanisms. For STM the probability assessment can 
be neglected or at least deferred until a quantitative analysis is appro-
priate. This piecing together is an uncomplicated process but does in-
volve "bookkeeping" such that the appropriate editing of the component 
failure transfer functions can be carried out. The component failure 
transfer functions are a limiting factor on the quality of the fault trees 
12 
resulting from STM. 
2.1 Basic Definitions 
Primary failures are basic component failures that require no 
further dissection since probability data for these failures are available, 
These probabilistic data are inputs to the quantitative analysis using 
the fault tree. 
A fault event is a failure situation resulting from one of the 
logical interactions of more than one primary failure. The most undesired 
fault event is at the top of the fault tree and is called the TOP event. 
The TOP event is the starting point of fault tree construction. There 
is only one TOP event in any given fault tree. 
A system component is a basic system constituent for which failures 
are considered primary failures during fault tree construction. Conse-
quently, the components of a given system can change depending on the TOP 
event being studied or the detail the analyst wishes to include in the 
fault tree analysis. Some components have several operating states, none 
of which are necessarily failed states. Relay contacts can be open or 
closed for example. The description of these states is called the com-
ponent configuration. 
Fault tree construction is the logical development of the TOP 
event. As the construction proceeds each fault event is also developed 
until primary failures are reached. The development of any event results 
in a branch of the fault tree. The event being developed is called the 
base event of the branch. The branch is complete only when all events in 
the branch are developed to the level of primary failures. Every event 
13 
in a branch is in the domain of the base event. In addition, if the base 
event is an input to an AND gate, every event in the branch is in the 
domain of every input to that AND gate. 
A fault tree gate is composed of two parts, (1) the Boolean logic 
symbol that relates the inputs of the gate to its output event and (2) 
the output event description. However, a gate is equivalent to another 
gate if, and only if, the logic symbol, the output event description, 
and another parameter, the "effective boundary conditions" associated with 
the output event, are identical. These effective boundary conditions 
will be considered in detail later. 
There are two parts to the event description, (1) the incident 
identification and (2) the entity identification. The incident identifi-
cation defines, as briefly as possible, the fault without indicating any 
hardware involved. The entity identification specifies the component or 
sub-system involved. These two parts are both required to describe the 
fault event. 
2.2 An Introduction to the Failure Transfer Functions 
The key to STM is associating a complete set of failure transfer 
functions with each system component. A component failure transfer func-
tion describes one mode of failure for a component and is a fundamental 
property of the component. The failure transfer functions are then in-
dependent of the system being analyzed. 
It is convenient at this time to define a device. A device is a 
piece of hardware whose modes of failure are somewhat different from the 
modes of failure of all other devices. Systems are composed of devices. 
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All components are devices. All components that are of identical design 
are the same device. Components that are not of identical design may, 
«'':'fc-':'v 
however, be the same device. If the complete set of failure transfer 
functions for a component is identical to the complete set of transfer 
functions of another component, they are then the same device. The number 
of devices in a given system is then always less than or equal to the num-
ber of components. Usually there are many more components than devices. 
Failure transfer functions can be thought of as a minute sub-fault tree. 
However, their appearance in the final system fault tree may be altered 
considerably. 
Once a failure transfer function for a device has been determined 
it may be catalogued as library data. This library data can then be up-
dated to reflect as much detail as desired. Otherwise, it is a constant 
property of the device. 
A failure transfer function may consist of as many as six parts, 
(1) an output event, (2) an output logic gate, (3) internal events, (4) 
internal logic gates, (5) input events, and (6) a discriminator. All of 
these parts can be determined from the fundamental workings of the com-
ponent isolated from any system environment. 
The output event is the mode of failure being considered. For a 
particular component, there is only one failure transfer function for a 
given output event. The output event is different from a fault event in 
that it requires no entity identification. 
The output gate designates the logic with which the failure trans-
fer function is coupled into the fault tree with other appropriate failure 
transfer functions having the same output event. There is one output 
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gate for each transfer function. 
Internal events are fault events, requiring further logical develop 
ment within the failure transfer function. There is always enough In-
formation available from the component isolated from any system environ-
ment to allow further development of these events. Internal gates desig-
nate the logical development of the internal events as required by the 
output and input events. 
Input events can be either primary events or undeveloped fault 
events. Input events represent the furthest development of the output 
event possible by considering the isolated component. 
The discriminator is a flag designating which failure transfer 
functions may coexist in the final fault tree. The discriminator can be 
determined from the component since it indicates which output events can 
actually coexist within the same component. There is no more than one 
discriminator assigned to each failure transfer function. 
A concept of the failure transfer function is illustrated in 
Figure 1. In a conventional sense, only the internal events and gates 
would be considered a transfer function; however, for the purposes of STM 
the conglomerate of all the parameters shown in Figure 1 is designated 
as the failure transfer function. 
An example of a failure transfer function for electrical contacts 
causing no current in a circuit is shown in Figure 2, An equally valid 
representation of this failure transfer function is shown as a Boolean 
logic diagram in Figure 3. The implication of the discriminator is that 












Figure 1. Concept of the Failure Transfer Function of Synthetic Tree Model 
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Figure 3. Boolean Logic Representation of the Failure Transfer 
Functions Shown in Figure 2 
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contacts to be open. Any event that is excluded by the output event, no 
current in the circuit, is considered to be not-allowed. In short, this 
means in this case that the contacts cannot be open and closed at the 
same time. 
In reflection, important characteristics of failure transfer func-
tions are: 
1. The component failure transfer functions are independent of 
the system being analyzed. 
2. A complete set of failure transfer functions for a device may 
be used to represent many system components. 
3. Failure transfer functions may be catalogued and used as 
library data. 
4. There are as many failure transfer functions for a component 
as there are modes of failure for that component. 
5. When a failure transfer function is used to develop an event, 
the use of certain other failure transfer functions can be excluded from 
the domain of that event. 
2.3 Ordered Fault Events 
Fault events that are used only as TOP events are First Order 
Fault Events. This development may be catalogued for frequently used 
JFirst Order Fault Events or provided as input to STM for each individual 
fault tree constructed. 
Fault events that state a condition of the system that extends 
beyond any single component are Second Order Fault Events. The entity 
identification then refers to a particular sub-system, or, more specifi-
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cally, to a variable that will later be defined as the "component coali-
tion." Component failure transfer functions are always used as the first 
step in developing the Second Order Fault Events. Examples of Second 
Order Fault Events are "current too long in a particular circuit" and "no 
current in a particular circuit." 
Fault events that cause a component to "behave failed" because part 
of the system itself, not simply another individual component, is causing 
that component to behave failed are Third Order Fault Events. An example 
of a Third Order Fault Event is "no current to a particular light bulb." 
Second Order Fault Events are always used as the first step in developing 
Third Order Fault; Events. 
Fault events that result in component A behaving failed because 
another component has direct input to component A, are Fourth Order Fault 
Events. An example of a Fourth Order Fault Event is "relay contacts held 
open." Component failure transfer functions are always used to develop 
Fourth Order Fault Events. 
2.4 Boundary Conditions 
2.4.1 System Boundary Conditions 
Without System Boundary Conditions it would not be possible to 
construct a fault tree. The boundary conditions in conjunction with the 
system schematic define the situation for which the fault tree is to be 
constructed. The System Boundary Conditions must be determined before any 
fault tree construction begins. 
A most important system boundary condition is the TOP event. For 
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any given system, a multitude of possibilities for TOP events exist. The 
selection of the "correct" TOP event ̂ s sometimes a difficult task. There 
are, however, no limitations on the event chosen as the TOP event. 
The system initial configuration is described by additional System 
Boundary Conditions. This configuration must represent the system in the 
unfalied state. Consequently these System Boundary Conditions depend on 
the TOP event. Initial Conditions are then System Boundary Conditions 
that define the operating condition of the system, i.e. all component 
configurations, for which the TOP event is applicable. 
System Boundary Conditions also include any fault event declared 
to exist or to be not-allowed for the duration of the fault tree construc-
tion. These events are called Existing System Boundary Conditions or 
Not-allowed System Boundary Conditions. An Existing System Boundary Con-
dition is treated as certain to occur while a Not-allowed System Boundary 
Condition is treated as an event with no possibility of occurring. Neither 
Existing nor Not-allowed System Boundary Conditions ever appear as events 
in the final system fault tree. 
2.4.2 Event Boundary Conditions 
Event Boundary Conditions are. boundary conditions associated with 
fault events in a fault tree and are implied by System Boundary Conditions 
or fundamental principles of set theory. A fault event is defined only 
wiien both the event description and the corresponding Event Boundary Con-
ditions are known. A most important corollary is that a fault event is 
equivalent to another fault event if, and only if, their event descrip-
tions and their associated Event Boundary Conditions are, in effect, 
identical. 
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Event Boundary Conditions are fault events or failure transfer 
functions that are considered as not-ail$wed or existing. All Not-allowed 
or Existing System Boundary Conditions are Event Boundary Conditions for 
every fault event in the fault tree. All other Event Boundary Conditions 
are generated by fault events as they appear in the fault tree. Once an 
Event Boundary Condition has been generated it is a boundary condition for 
every fault event that is in the domain of the fault event that generated 
the boundary condition. Fault events outside the domain of this base 
event are in no way affected by the boundary condition. 
2.4.3 Effective Boundary Conditions 
Effective Boundary Conditions are Event Boundary Conditions of a 
gate that actually affect the development of the gate. An event with an 
arbitrary number of Event Boundary Conditions may have no Effective 
Boundary Conditions. In practice, Effective Boundary Conditions are the 
only boundary conditions of any significance. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to predict which Event Boundary Conditions are Effective Boundary 
Conditions; an event must be developed before its Effective Boundary Con-
ditions are known. However, an observation that proves to be helpful in 
STM is that if the Event Boundary Conditions of two gates are identical 
the Effective Boundary Conditions must also be identical. 
* 2.5 Class of Third Order Fault Events 
Recall that Third Order Fault Events require development using 
Second Order Fault Events. Several Second Order Fault Events may be re-
quired as input to a single gate whose event is a Third Order Fault Event. 
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The logic symbol used for this gate is dependent on the Third Order Fault 
Event being developed and is independent of the system being analyzed. 
Each incident identification for Third Order Fault Events is assigned to 
a Class. The entity identification does not affect the Class of the Third 
Order Fault Event. Class I indicates a Third Order Fault Event that re-
quires an OR gate while Class II requires an AND gate. 
2.6 Category of Second Order Fault Events 
Recall that Second Order Fault Events are developed using failure 
transfer functions of the components. However, it is possible for a 
Second Order Fault Event to appear during fault tree construction for 
which no transfer functions are available as input. This occurs because 
no appropriate component can fail in a manner so as to cause (or transmit) 
the Second Order Fault Event or Event Boundary Conditions can censor all, 
otherwise appropriate, failure transfer functions. 
A Second Order Fault Event is in Category I if it is considered 
not-allowed if no failure transfer functions are available for its de-
velopment. Category II indicates a Second Order Fault Event that is con-




FAULT TREE TERMINOLOGY 
3.1 Fault Tree Symbols 
Fault tree symbols fall, basically, into two categories: logic 
symbols and event symbols. Logic symbols are shown in Figure 4 while 
^ v i u • ™ c 7,8,20 event symbols are shown in Figure 5. 
The logic symbols, or logic gates, are used to interconnect the 
events that could cause the specified main event, or TOP event. The 
logic gates that are most frequently used to develop fault trees are the 
basic AND and OR Boolean expressions. The AND gate provides an output 
event only if all input events are presented simultaneously. The OR 
gate provides an output event if one or more of the input events are 
present. The Boolean algebra associated with these two logic gates is 
presented in greater detail in the next section. 
The more frequently used event symbols are the rectangle, circle 
and diamond. The rectangle represents a fault event resulting from the 
combination of more basic faults acting through logic gates. They may 
indeed be thought of as part of their associated logic gate. The circle 
designates a basic system component failure or fault input that is mutu-
ally independent from all other events designated by circles and diamonds. 
The diamond symbol describes fault inputs that are considered basic in 
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Figure 4. Fault Tree Logic Symbols 
26 
sense that laboratory data is applicable. Rather, the fault tree is 
simply not developed further, either because the event is of insufficient 
consequence or the necessary information is unavailable. Nevertheless, 
in order to obtain a solution for a fault tree, both circles and diamonds 
must represent events for which reliability information is input to the 
fault tree. For the study presented herein, events that appear as circles 
or diamonds are referred to as primary events. 
The triangles shown in Figure 5 are not strictly event symbols 
although they have traditionally been classified as such. The triangle 
indicates a transfer from one part of the fault tree to another. A line 
from the side of the triangle (transfer out triangle) denotes an event 
transfer out from the associated logic gate. A line from the apex of the 
triangle denotes an event transfer into the associated logic gate from 
the transfer out triangle with the same identification number. 
The other logic gates and events symbols are shown in Figure 4 and 
Figure 5 and are explained in those figures. 
3.2 The OR Gate21 
The fault tree symbol f \ is an OR gate and represents the union 
of the events attached to the gate. Any one or more of the events input 
to the gate must occur in order for the event above the gate to occur. 
The OR gate is equivalent to the Boolean symbol L/ . For example, the 
OR gate with two input events, as shown below, is equivalent to the 
Boolean expression, B = A. \J A«. 
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J 
B = A ^ A , 
1 In the above illustration, the symbol " ̂  " is to be interpreted as "in 
equivalent to." Either of the events A, or A«, or both, must occur in 
order for B to occur. 
Shown below is a realistic example of an OR gate for a fault con-
dition of a set of normally open contacts. 
I 
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An "OR" gate is merely a re-expression of the event above the gate 
(B) in terms of the more elementary input events (A-pA^). The event 
above the gate encompasses all of these more elementary events; if any 
one or more of these elementary events occurs, then B occurs. This "re-
expression" interpretation is quite important since it characterizes an 
OR gate and differentiates it from an AND gate. Whenever an event can be 
broken into more elementary events, then an OR gate is immediately drawn. 
The input events to an OR gate do not cause the event above the gate, 
they simply are the event above the gate "separated" into more detail. 
If any one or more of the more particular events A,...A , assuming 
a case where n events are attached to B by an OR gate, occurs, then the 
more general event B occurs. 
A. 
l 
B; i = l,...n, 
where the symbol " >r " is to be interpreted as "implies." 
3.3 The AND Gate2 
The fault tree symbolf|is an AND gate and represents the inter-
section of the events attached to the gate. The AND gate is equivalent 
to the Boolean symbol O . All of the events input to the AND gate must 
occur in order for the event above the gate to occur. For two events 
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a t t a c h e d to the AND g a t e , the equ iva len t Boolean express ion i s 
B = Ax P | A2. , * ^ 
B 
f\ 




B = A 1 f | A2 
The event is only caused, or happens, if every one of the input 
events occurs. The cause relationship is what differentiates an AND gate 
from an OR gate. If the event above the gate occurs when any one of the 
input events occurs, then the gate is an OR gate and the event is merely 
a restatement of the input events. If the event above the gate occurs 
only when combinations of more elementary events occur, then the gate is 
an AND gate and each input is a cause of the event above the gate. (In 
set theory terminology, for an OR gate, each input event is a subset of 
the event above the gate while for an AND gate each input is not a subset 
of the event above the gate.) 
For n events attached to the AND gate, the equivalent Boolean ex-
pression is 




The event B is caused by A, and k~ and A,,...and Afl all occurring simul-
taneously. * ;^ 
In general, the events attached to the AND gate are not inter-
preted to be independent, but instead are interpreted as occurring when 
the events-to its left have already occurred. For example, in the two 
event illustration of the AND gate, 
means 
where A-/A, is the event A2 given that A. has already occurred. Â ^ is 
a failure occurring with no other failures already existing in the system; 
it is the "first" failure. A2/A, is the failure A2 occurring with the 
failure A, already existing in the system; A2 is thus the "second" 
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failure. If A, is traced to more basic failures or causes, then the 
system will be examined with no previous^failure already having occurred. 
If A« is traced to more basic failures or causes the system already having 
the failure A, will be examined for more basic events. The system exam-
ined for A1 is thus of a different nature from the system examined for A«. 
For example, the failure A, may have caused the system to undergo a dif-
ferent operation. The failure A„ will then be traced to the more primary 
failures with the system in this different operation. 
The AND gate may also be represented with A„ as the "first" event, 
i.e., the event leftmost in the gate. 
For those instances in which order of cause is not significant 
(which applies to most situations), this representation is entirely equiv-
alent with the preceding one (where A, was the "first" event). For A« 
represented first, as shown above, A, will now be traced with the failure 
A„ already existing. Where order of cause is not important, which fail-
ure is represented first is completely arbitrary and the particular se-
quence chosen is that which most simplifies the analysis. 
When the order of occurrence of the failures is pertinent, the 
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first failure having tp occur is represented leftmost on the gate and 
then the second failure necessary is the fight failure on the gate. The 
second failure will still be analyzed with the first failure already ex-
isting, as before. 
One may say then that when order is unimportant, an ordering of 
the causes for further analysis is arbitrarily picked. When order is 
important the particular ordering necessary is dictated from the failure 
being investigated. In either case, the second failure is investigated 
with the first failure already existing. 
For the case of n events A..... .A attached to the AND gate refer 
I n 
to the figure on the next page. The event B is caused by all of the 
events A.., A9,...A having to occur. For A-/A. we are examining the oc-
currence of A« under the condition that A, has occurred. For A /A,...A , 
2 1 n 1 n-1 
we are examining the occurrence of A under the condition that A,,...A , • n 1* n-1 
have already all previously occurred. In general, we are examining the 
possible causes or re-expressions of the event A, with the system in the 
state such that A1,A2,...A, * are already existing. We are thus looking 
at the system with succeedingly more failures already existing. 
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"A9 when A, 
has already 
occurred" 
"A,, when A. 
and A« have 
already both 
occurred" 
"A when A, .., n 1 
A n have all n-1 
already oc-
curred" 
Only when the event (A, ) is independent of the events to its left 
(A, ......A..) can we neglect these left events as having already occurred, 
That is, if A,,A?,...A, , have not changed in any way the nature of the 
system, then we can neglect all of these failures already existing and 
consider A, as occurring in a system free of other failures, 
The INHIBIT condition representation is shown below. 
In Boolean representation 
B = I O (A/I) = I O A 
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An INHIBIT gate therefore is equivalent to an AND gate. The 
INHIBIT condition represents an event, a* condition, or an environment 
that must exist along with A in order to cause B. The INHIBIT condition 
is only different from an event in that the causes of the inhibit condi-
tion are of no concern and are not further traced on the tree. The event 
A is traced to its causes with the condition that I is not existing. 
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3.4 Cut Sets 
The events of a fault tree can be Boolean manipulated in order to 
obtain the minimal cut sets of a fault tree. A minimal cut set is the 
i 
smallest set of primary events which must all occur in order for the TOP 
event to occur. A primary event is a circle or diamond on the tree of 
is an INHIBIT condition. A primary event is thus a component failure, 
environmental effect, administrative error, etc. The primary events 
represent the resolution of the fault tree. The minimal cut sets repre-
sent the modes by which the TOP event can occur. For example, the mini-
mal cut set A,A« means that both the primary events A, and A« must occur 
in order for the TOP event to occur. A, and A„ is a mode by which the 
TOP event occurs. If either A, or A~ does not occur, then the TOP event 
does not occur by this mode. The set of events A,A~C, where C is another 
primary event, is not a minimal cut set since C is redundant and is not 
necessary for the occurrence of the TOP event; C can either occur or not 
occur and as long as A, and A« both occur, then the TOP event will occur. 
The minimal cut sets are significant since they depict which fail-
ures must first be corrected in order for the TOP failure to be cor-
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rected.* The minimal cut sets often give the "weakest links" in the 
system. The primary failures (i.e., pripary events) in the one event 
minimal cut sets usually should first be corrected. With these single 
failures corrected, the failures in the two event critical paths should 
then usually be corrected, and so forth. A single failure analysis is an 
investigation, or fault tree drawn, in order to obtain only the one pri-
mary event minimal cut set, (single failures) of the TOP event. For a 
single failure analysis, the fault tree ends whenever an AND gate is 
reached, that does not have deeper common causes (which effectively 
transform an AND gate to an OR gate). 
23 The basic Boolean operations are summarized below. 
1. Distributive Laws 
A n <B u c) = (A n B) u (A n °> 
A (J (B n C) = (A |J B) O (A IJ C) 
2. DeMorgan's Theorems 
(A U B)' = A' O B1 
(A Pi B)' = Ar |J B' 
3. Laws of Absorption 
A (J B = A ; B Q A 
A O B=B;B ( 3 A 
The symbol " ' " denotes the complement of an event; A1 thus means 
"the event A not occurring." The symbol " *-^ " denotes "is a subset of"; 
A failure being "corrected" means its removal, a lowering of its 
probability, or a coupling of the failure with another failure (adding a 
redundancy). 2i 
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B C A denotes that B is a subset of A. B is a subset of A if and only 
if the occurrence of B implies the occurrence of A; if B occurs then A 
••automatically" occurs. For the manipulation of events on a fault tree 
we will be principally concerned with the Distributive Laws and the Laws 
of Absorption. 
Consider the following simple fault tree. 
T is the TOP event and A, and A« are certain fault events and C^, C^, C^, 
and C* are the primary failures. As stated previously, for Boolean manip-
ulation a unique symbol is assigned to each unique event. Thus T cor-
responds to the word description of the TOP failure, etc. In terms of 
Boolean algebra; 
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T = Ax fl
 A
2 
Al = Cl U C2 
A2 = Cl U <• 
By inspection of the fault tree shown above the 
sets of occurrence of the events C,C,, C.Co> 
C2C1, and C2C3 will cause the TOP event to oc-
cur. These sets are called the Boolean Indi-
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cated Cuts Sets of the fault tree. 
In Boolean algebra, these three equations are equivalent to the 
fault tree. For a Boolean representation of a fault tree, every gate on 
the fault tree must have its equivalent Boolean equation. Here a gate 
corresponds to the event (rectangle) immediately above the gate. Thus, 
for the above fault tree, there is a Boolean equation for T, for A,, and 
for A«. 
Subs tituting the expressions for A., and A« into the expression for T, 
T = (C1 U G2) O (Gx U C3) . 
Using the distributive law, 
(cx u c2> n <
ci u °3) = ci u <c2 n c 3 ) . 
The minimal cut sets of T are then the one primary event minimal cut set 
C. and the two event minimal cut set C2C~. T occurs if C, occurs or if 
both C« and C« occur. 
The object of Boolean manipulation is to obtain the TOP event T 
in the form 
T = M1(J M2 U M3..." (jMn 
where the M.fs are events consisting of intersections of primary events 
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(c i rc les or diamonds), 
M i= A nn i n •••Aim 
where A..., etc. are primary events and where M. is not a subset of another 
M.(i.e., the primary events of a certain M, are not all contained in an-
other M.). If this form for T is obtained, then the M.'s are the minimal 
cut set of the fault tree. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CHARACTERISTIC FACTORS OF SYNTHETIC TREE MODEL 
There are five characteristic, discrete factors that must be 
determined before Synthetic Tree Model can be implemented. It is felt 
that these five factors limit universal application of Synthetic Tree 
Model. A sufficient number of values are determined for each of these 
variables to allow Synthetic"Tree Model to be applicable to certain elec-
trical systems. 
These characteristic, discrete factors are the: 
(1) Component failure transfer functions. 
(2) Component Coalition scheme. 
(3) Class of the Third Order Fault Events. 
(4) Category of the Second Order Fault Events. 
(5) Inter-correlation between the fault events and the boundary 
conditions. 
With the exception of the Component Coalition scheme each of these 
factors can be catalogued as library data and corrected and updated as 
necessary, since they are of an "open ended" nature. It is possible to 
ascertain the Component Coalition scheme in complete, exact, closed form 
for electrical systems. 
4.1 Particulars of the Failure Transfer Functions 
The quality of the fault tree constructed by Synthetic Tree Model 
depends on the quality of the component failure transfer functions. 
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Recall that it is not necessary to catalogue a failure transfer function 
for each component, only for each device**1 JSach component that is in ef-
fect the same device, use the same failure transfer function. It is 
envisioned, that as Synthetic Tree Model becomes more sophisticated the 
component failure transfer functions will become more detailed. 
A consideration during the development of all failure transfer 
functions is that only failure modes are to be considered. Often a Second 
Order Fault Event can be "allowed to happen" by a component that can never 
fail in a manner to cause that Second Order Fault Event. Such possibil-
ities are never included as failure transfer functions. For example, a 
fuse may well allow the fault "current too long in its circuit" to happen 
but a fuse never fails such that it causes "current too long in its 
circuit." 
For the failure transfer functions given as examples herein, it is 
assumed the system was constructed perfectly with no components installed 
that do not meet specifications. This is not a limitation of Synthetic 
Tree Model but rather just a convention adopted here for convenience. 
Several examples of failure transfer functions are given in Appen-
dix A in the Boolean logic notation. Some care must be used when drawing 
conclusions from the failure transfer functions presented here since they 
are of a very simple nature. The failure transfer functions for some 
* 
devices can be very complex and somewhat more difficult to determine. 
Even in conventional fault tree construction, however, the failure trans-
fer functions must, in effect, be determined. 
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4.1.1 How to Obtain the Failure Transfer Functions 
The majority of a failure transfe^fiinction for a device is deter-
mined by conventional failure mode analysis. Recall that failure mode 
analysis has been defined as a method of identifying all possible means 
by which a device can fail to perform its required function. This failure 
mode analysis then immediately provides the failure transfer function out-
put event—that is the Second Order and Fourth Order Fault Events that 
the component failure transfer functions can be used to develop. 
The output logic gate is determined by recognizing the logical rela-
tion the device failure has to the Second or Fourth Order Fault Event 
that the device failure transfer function can be used to develop. That 
is to say, the output logic gate depicts the way the event being developed 
is transferred through the component. If the component failure alone can 
cause the fault event being developed then the output logic gate is OR. 
If, however, the component failure is required in addition to the fault 
event being developed, then the output logic gate is AND. 
Internal events give further information about the failure mode 
and should be used liberally. Their appearance in a final fault tree 
gives local insight about the transfer function input events. The internal 
gates depict the logical relationship between the internal events and the 
input events. The input events are primary failures or Third Order Fault 
* 
Events or Fourth Order Fault Events, 
After this failure mode analysis information has been supplied to 
the set of failure transfer functions, a discriminator is set. The dis-
criminator is a flag set to indicate which failure modes (failure transfer 
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functions) can coexist in the component and is generally determinable 
from the output event description. Failure transfer functions used to 
develop Fourth Order Fault Events do not need a discriminator since Fourth 
Order Fault Events arise only from failure transfer functions that do have 
discriminators. 
4.2 Examples of Determining Failure Transfer Functions 
Examples of determining the failure transfer functions reflect the 
same general procedure as a Failure Mode Analysis of a system component. 
The examples of the fuse and contacts provide general examples of this 
determination. 
4.2.1 The Failure Transfer Function for a Fuse 
To determine the failure transfer function for a fuse, consider 
the ways a fuse can fail by considering its design. A fuse is an over-
current protective device, with a circuit-opening fusible member directly 
heated and destroyed by the passage of over current. A fuse, by not per-
forming as intended, can fail by transmitting an overload. Also since 
the fusible member of a fuse transmits current under normal operation, 
the fuse can randomly fail so as to cause "no current." There are then 
two failure transfer functions for a fuse, one with the output event 
"overload" and another with the output event "no current." 
t The failure transfer function for the output event "overload" will 
be determined first. Since the fuse alone can not cause an overload—it 
can only transmit an existing overload—the output gate is AND. There 
is only one input event to the transfer function, primary failure of the 
fuse to open circuit when subjected to an overload. There are no internal 
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events or gates. 
For the output event "ho curre^£," the output gate is OR since the 
fuse alone can cause "no current." Again there is only one input event--
primary failure of the fuse (fuse opens). 
The failure transfer functions for a fuse are given in Figure 6 in 
the Boolean logic tree notation. The discriminators are set different 
so as to denote that the two failure transfer function output events are 
not allowed to coexist, that is a fuse cannot be failed open and closed 
at the same time. Note that other input events could have been provided 
such as "oversize fuse installed," but recall that all components are as-
sumed to meet specifications. This does, however, demonstrate that the 
failure transfer functions are not complete, only sufficient. 
4.2.2 Failure Transfer Functions for Contacts 
Contacts are a device that represent several different type com-
ponents --switches, relay contacts, circuit breaker contacts, etc. Since 
contacts can be designed to be normally open or closed in a system, either 
condition must be considered as a possible failed state. 
By their designed intent contact failures can result in "no-current, 
"current," "no current too long," or "current too long." Since contacts 
are a low resistance device, their shorting to cause an overload is not 
credible. The Second Order Fault Event "current too long" and "no current 
to*o long" included because, during later analysis, a timer relay coil 
will be considered. The event "no current" can be caused by the contacts 
alone; therefore, its associated output logic gate is OR. On the other 
hand the output logic gates for the other two fault events are AND. Each 
mm 
44 
DISCRIMINATOR = 1 
ZIL 
[""FUSE SUB- I 
| JECTED TO I 
LJOVEKLQAP J 




Figure 6. Failure Transfer Functions for Fuse in Boolean Logic 
Notation 
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has an interval event, "contacts open," "contacts closed," "contacts 
closed too long," and "contacts open too.long," respectively. The input 
events to the four failure transfer functions include both primary events 
and Fourth Order Fault Events as shown in Figure 7. 
4.3 Particulars of the Component Coalition Scheme 
While the Component Coalition Scheme is determined for electrical 
systems in exact, closed form, it perhaps affords the most interesting 
challenge encountered in an effort to extend Synthetic Tree Model to in-
clude other types of systems. This results from its being a scheme rather 
than determinable on the basis of fault events. 
The appropriate scheme is, however, certainly not difficult to ap-
ply to electrical systems. The component coalition is determinable from 
the system schematic diagram alone and is independent of the particular 
components involved with the exception of the power supply. 
4.3.1 How to Determine the Component Coalition 
Components in an electrical system receive system "feedback" 
through electrical wiring. This connection forms the premise of deter-
mining the component coalition. One electrical flow path from the power 
supply through a component constitutes a means that component can receive 
(or not receive) power. 
If the system components are separated by a minimum number of nodes 
* 
and no node appears more than once in such an electrical flow path, that 
electrical flow path is a series circuit path and indicates a component 
coalition. One component can appear in several series circuit paths. If 
a component receives no current, it must receive no current from each and 
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every series circuit path that contains that component. On the other 
hand, a component can be supplied cui*rent by any one of the series circuit 
paths containing that component. 
A component coalition for an electrical system is a collection of 
components in a series circuit path. If wiring is to be included in the 
component coalition, it must be designated as a component. There are as 
many component coalitions as there are series circuit paths. 
In many systems, there may be several sub-systems each with its own 
power supply. In Synthetic Tree Model, each such sub-system is called a 
panel. No panel can have wiring common to another panel; however, more 
than one power supply is allowed per panel. Each component coalition can 
contain components from only one panel. There can be interfacing between 
panels by mechanical coupling between one or more components. For example, 
a relay coil may provide mechanical input to relay contacts in another 
panel. There may also be such mechanical interplay within a given panel. 
This mechanical interplay in no way affects the component coalition. 
Panels with no electrical wiring then may contain only one component. The 
component coalition for such a panel is simply the one component. 
4.3.2 Example of Determining the Component Coalition 
As an example of determining the component coalition, consider the 











Component D is the relay coil for contacts F. 
To determine the component coalition, determine as many current 
flow paths through the power supply as possible for each panel such that 
no node occurs in the flow path more than once. 
For panel 1, there is one component coalition, components J, E, F, 
G, and H. For panel 2 there are two component coalitions, components A, 
I, and B and components A, I, C, and D. 
4.4 Particulars of the Category of the Second Order Fault Event 
Before determining the Category of the Second Order Fault Event 
it is necessary to determine the incident identification of all the Sec-
ond Order Fault Events themselves. Recall that all output events of trans 
fer functions are either the incident identification of a Second Order 
* 
Fault Event or the incident identification of a Fourth Order Fault Event. 
All Fourth Order Fault Event incident identifications indicate mechanical 
input to one or more components while the Second Order Fault Event inci-
dent identifications indicate a condition of a component coalition. The 
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Second Order Fault Event incident identifications are then determinable 
from the output events of the failure, :feransfer functions. 
4.4.1 How to Determine the Category of Second Order Fault Events 
All Second Order Fault Events with identical incident identifica-
tions are of the same Category. That is to say the Category is indepen-
dent of the component coalition involved. Recall Second Order Fault 
Events of Category I are considered "not-allowed" if there are no failure 
transfer functions available to develop that Second Order Fault Event from 
the associated component coalition, while Category II indicates a Second 
Order Fault Event is "existing" if no failure transfer functions are 
available. A basic premise of electrical system design is that conductors 
are used to transmit a specified amount of current. Therefore, any fault 
event that denotes an event contrary to this premise and there is nothing 
in the component coalition to cause that fault event is not-allowed or 
Category I. If, however, the fault event indicates a condition compati-
ble to this premise and there is nothing in the component coalition to 
cause that fault event the fault event is existing or category II. All 
Second Order Fault Events with the same incident identification are of 
the same Category. 
4.4.2 Examples of Categories of Second Order Fault Events 
In accordance with the above stipulations all Second Order Fault 
* 
Events with the incident identification, "no current," "no current too 
long," and "overload" are of Category I while "current" and "current too 
long" are of category II. 
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4.5 Particulars of the Class of Third Order Fault Events 
Third Order Fault Event identification can be determined directly 
from the Second Order Fault Event incident identification. Recall that 
while the entity identification of a Third Order Fault Event indicates a 
particular component coalition, the Third Order Fault Event has the same 
incident identification as a Second Order Fault Event. There is then a 
one-to-one correspondence between Third Order Fault Events and Second 
Order Fault Event incident identifications. Also recall that Second Order 
Fault Events are used exclusively to develop Third Order Fault Events. 
4.5.1 How to Determine the Class of the Third Order Fault Event 
The Class of the Third Order Fault Events are determined in a 
straightforward, logical manner. If failure, in a manner indicated by 
the Third Order Fault Event incident identification, of every component 
coalition involving a given component is required to produce the Third 
Order Fault Event in that given component, the Third Order Fault Event is 
of Class I. If, on the other hand, failure in the manner indicated by 
the Third Order Fault Event incident identification, of any of the com-
ponent coalitions involving a given component will produce the Third 
Order Fault Event in that given component, the Third Order Fault Event is 
of Class II. Every Third Order Fault Event with the same incident identi-
fication is of the same Class. 
4?5.2 Examples of the Class of Third Order Fault Events 
Third Order Fault Events with the incident identification "no cur-
rent" are of Class I while Third Order Fault Events with the incident 
identification "current," and "overload" are of class II. 
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4.6 Particulars of the Inter-Correlation Between Fault Events 
and Boundary i&6nd it ions 
Only First and Second Order Fault Events are involved in the Inter 
correlation between Fault Events and Boundary Conditions. Recall that 
higher order Fault Events always involve a particular component. The 
purpose of the Boundary Condition is to edit the Component Transfer Func-
tions. The effect of higher order Fault Event Boundary Condition genera-
tion must be taken into account during the development of the failure 
transfer functions themselves. 
4.6.1 How to Determine the Inter-Correlation Between First Order Fault 
Events and Boundary Conditions 
A First Order Fault Event always generates Not-allowed Event 
Boundary Conditions. Since the First Order Fault Event is the base event 
for the entire fault tree, the failure transfer functions for the compo-
nent indicated by the entity identification of the First Order Fault 
Event are never allowed to appear.in the fault trees and hence are Not-
allowed Boundary Conditions. 
4.6.2 How to Determine the Inter-Correlation Between Second Order Fault 
Events and Boundary Conditions 
Second Order Fault Events can generate Not-allowed Event Boundary 
Conditions or Existing Event Boundary Conditions. Not-allowed Event 
Boundary Conditions are generated because of events being excluded by 
the Second Order Fault Event, while Existing Event Boundary Conditions 
result from implications of the system initial conditions. 
4.6.2.1 Type 1 Second Order Fault Event Boundary Conditions. The 
occurrence of a Second Order Fault Event, A, generates other Second Order 
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Fault Events that are excluded by the Second Order Fault Event, A, as Not-
aliowed Event Boundary Conditions. •SM*:..:^ 
4.6.2.2 Type 2 Second Order Fault Event Boundary Conditions. The 
occurrence of Second Order Fault Event can imply that certain component 
failures are not-allowed during the development of that Second Order 
Fault Event because the Second Order Fault Events exclude the component 
failure. 
4.6.2.3 Type 3 Second Order Fault Event Boundary Conditions. Once 
a Transfer Function, A, is used to develop a Second Order Fault Event, 
Transfer Functions with discriminators different from A are Not-allowed 
Event Boundary Conditions. 
4.6.2.4 Type 4 Second Order Fault Event Boundary Conditions. 
Second Order Fault Events can also generate Existing Event Boundary Condi-
tions. These Event Boundary Conditions are always implied by the system 
initial conditions. The system unfailed state is defined by the initial 
conditions; therefore, if a fault event indicates a component, when func-
tioning as designed, is in this "unfailed," initial state, this "unfailed" 
state is an Existing Event Boundary Condition. That is to say, if the 
system, as indicated by a fault event, "forces" a component into a state 
corresponding to its "initial," "unfailed" state, then this "unfailed" 
state does, indeed, subsequently exist and is not considered a "fault" 
event at all. 
The need for this type of Event Boundary Condition arises because 
a given component configuration in one system may represent a failed state, 
while in another system this same configuration may indicate the unfailed 
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state. It is then not surprising that under certain conditions in certain 
systems, certain events that generallycan be fault events are not and, 
indeed, are considered existing. 
Recall that Second Order Fault Events "state a condition of the 
system." If this system state does, indeed, generate a component config-
uration identical to the component configuration in the "unfailed" system 
then this component configuration is subsequently an existing event 
boundary condition. Second Order Fault Events are the only fault events 
capable of generating Existing Event Boundary Conditions. 
4.6.3 Examples of the Inter-Correlation Between Fault Events and Boundary 
Conditions 
First Order Fault Event Boundary Condition—If the TOP Event is "a 
certain light bulb failing to produce light," later in the fault tree 
the bulb is not-allowed to fail again by short circuiting or open cir-
cuiting. 
Type 1 Second Order Fault Event Boundary Condition—If the fault 
event "no current in a given series circuit path" is being developed, the 
Second Order Fault Events indicating current in that same series current 
path are not-allowed. 
Type 2 Second Order Fault Event Boundary Condition—If the Second 
Order Fault Event "current in a given series circuit path" is being de-
s 
veloped, none of the components in the coalition indicated by that series 
circuit path are allowed to fail so as to cause no current in any series 
current path. 
Type 3 Second Order Fault Event Boundary Condition—If during the 
development of a base event, a Second Order Fault Event calls for the fuse 
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failure transfer function indicating that fuse is causing an overload, 
then during the continued development oijytphat same base event that fuse 
is not-allowed to fail to open. 
Type 4 Second Order Fault Event Boundary Condition—If a Second 
Order Fault Event indicates current is being supplied to a relay coil so 
that its contacts would be closed and the initial condition includes 
those contacts being closed, then those contacts being closed is an Exist-
ing Event Boundary Condition for. the Second Order Fault Event. 
4.6.4 Comments 
The fully developed Inter-correlation between Second Order Fault 
Events and Boundary Conditions is given for a number of Second Order 
Fault Events in Appendix A. The inter-correlation provided there is felt 
to be sufficient for all system Fault Trees that use only those Second 
Order Fault Events. The inter-correlation is of an "open-ended" structure 
and, consequently, additional inter-correlation information can be added 
as Synthetic Tree Model is extended. 
s 
CHAPTER V 
FAULT TREE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY OF SYNTHETIC TREE MODEL 
Synthetic Tree Model is similar to conventional fault tree 
construction techniques in that it starts with the TOP event and the 
development then proceeds through intermediate gates to the primary 
failures of the components. The construction is then complete when the 
terminal events of every branch are primary fault events. 
If the TOP event is a fault event of a higher order than a First 
Order Fault Event, then defining the TOP event is sufficient to trigger 
the mechanism of STM to complete the fault tree. If, however, the TOP 
event is a First Order Fault Event, the development of that First Order 
Fault Event must be supplied such that all input events to that First 
Order Fault Event are higher order events or primary events. That is to 
say, the analyst must provide enough of the fault tree such that STM can 
get started. 
5.1 Catalogued First Order Fault Events 
Certain First Order Fault Events are often required repeatedly 
during the application of fault tree analysis. The required development 
» 
of such First Order Fault Events can be conveniently catalogued in a 
library in a manner similar to the failure transfer functions. In fact, 
an identical format can be used with the exception that the discriminator 
is not required. 
There is then a one to one correspondence between: 
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(1) the First Order Fault Event and the failure transfer function 
output event, .^-; 
(2) the first logic gate under the First Order Fault Event and 
the output logic gate, 
(3) gates used to develop the First Order Fault Event and the 
failure transfer function internal events, 
(4) the required final level events--higher order than the First 
Order Fault Event--and the failure transfer function input events. 
An example of the development of such a First Order Fault Event 
is given in Appendix A. 
5.2 How to Use Boundary Conditions 
During the construction of the fault tree by STM, before any event 
is placed in the fault tree or any failure transfer function is used, it 
is checked to see if it is a boundary condition. The procedure used to 
deal with events that are boundary conditions depends on what kind of 
boundary condition it is and on the logic gate to which the event is 
attached. 
5.2.1 What to Do if a Fault Event Is a Not-allowed Boundary Condition 
If a fault event or failure transfer function about to appear in 
the fault tree is a Not-allowed Boundary Condition for the gate to which 
the fault event or failure transfer function is about to be attached and 
* 
that gate is an OR gate, the fault event is simply not used in the fault 
tree. This simple removal is possible since the gate from which the fault 
event or failure transfer function is removed can still provide an output 
event trigger since it is an OR gate. 
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If, however, the fault event or failure transfer function is a Not-
allowed Boundary Condition and it is about to be attached to an AND gate, 
the entire AND gate is removed from the fault tree as are all the immedi-
ately preceding AND gates up to the next OR gate. This is because, if 
one of the inputs to an AND gate does not occur, there can be no occurrence 
of the output event, hence no failure through that AND gate. The AND gate 
is then unnecessary for the fault tree and is removed since it too is 
not-allowed. The same argument can be extended to all immediately pre-
ceding AND gates. 
5.2.2 What to Do if a Fault Event Is an Existing Boundary Condition 
If a fault event or failure transfer function about to appear in 
the fault tree is an Existing Boundary Condition for the gate to which 
the fault event or failure transfer function is about to be attached and 
that gate is an AND gate, the fault event is simply not used in the fault 
tree. This simple removal is possible because an input to an AND gate 
being "true" makes no contribution to the fault tree. 
If, however, the fault event or failure transfer function about to 
appear is an Existing Boundary Condition and it is attached to an OR gate, 
the entire OR gate is removed from the fault tree as are all the immedi-
ately preceding OR gates up to the next AND gate. An existing event then 
triggers through OR gates. 
* 
5.3 How to Develop a Second Order Fault Event 
A Second Order Fault Event is always developed using failure trans-
fer functions. Only failure transfer functions of the components in the 
component coalition indicated by the entity identification of the Second 
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Order Fault Event are considered. The failure transfer functions with 
AND Output logic gates, if any, are thejn added, in any order, to the fault 
tree to develop the Second Order Fault Event. Finally, the failure trans-
fer functions with OR output logic gates, if any are added, in any order, 
to the development of the Second Order Fault Event. 
The output event of the failure transfer function does not appear 
in the fault tree but rather is only a flag to indicate which failure 
transfer functions to use to develop a given Second Order Fault Event. 
If there are several failure transfer functions with AND output logic 
gates, each of these failure transfer functions is connected to only one 
AND gate in the fault tree. If there are, in addition, failure transfer 
functions with OR output logic gates, one OR gate is used as an input to 
the previous AND gate and these failure transfer functions are then con-
nected to this OR gate. 
If there are, however, no failure transfer functions available 
with AND output logic gates, but there are failure transfer functions with 
OR output logic gates, then the Second Order Fault Event being developed 
has an OR logic gate only. 
An example of the development of Second Order Fault Events appears 
in Chapter VI. 
5.4 How to Develop Third Order Fault Events 
* • ' c — ! ; • 
Third Order Fault Events are developed using Second Order Fault 
Events. Every component coalition containing the component indicated by 
the entity identification of the Third Order Fault Event is determined. 
There is a one to one correspondence between those component coalitions 
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and the Second Order Fault Events used to develop the Third Order Fault 
Event. The input events to the Third Order Fault Event are Second Order 
Fault Events with the same incident identification as the Third Order 
Fault Event and with their entity identification representing one of these 
component coalitions. 
The logic gate used to connect the Second Order Fault Events to 
the Third Order Fault Events is determined directly by the Class of the 
Third Order Fault Event. 
Examples of development of Third Order Fault Events are given in 
Chapter VT. 
5.5 , How to Develop Fourth Order Fault Events 
Fourth Order Fault Events are developed using failure transfer 
functions. Recall that STM allows for direct interplay between components. 
If a component, A, receives input from one or more components, this inter-
play correlation must be provided as input to STM. From this correlation 
and incident identification of the Fourth Order Fault Event, the exact 
failure transfer functions used to develop the Fourth Order Fault Event, 
are determined. 
The failure transfer function output event is a flag used to corre-
late the failure transfer function to the particular Fourth Order Fault 
Event incident identification and does not appear in the fault tree. The 
* 
output gate of the failure transfer function indicates the logical rela-
tionship of the transfer functions, if more than one, used to develop the 
Fourth Order Fault Event. If no interplay correlation is provided for 
the component indicated by the entity identification of the Fourth Order 
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Fault Event, that Fourth Order Fault Event is not developed and appears 
in the fault tree as a diamond symbol.,^^ 
5.6 Final Editing Concerns 
The use of STM as presented thus far results in fault trees that 
may require further editing. While the fault tree is perhaps "academi-
cally correct" without this editing, the editing puts the fault tree in 
conventional format that is convenient for the analyst. 
5.6.1 Transfers 
Transfers within a fault tree should be approached with extreme 
caution. A transfer within a fault tree cannot be used simply because 
two events have identical incident and entity identifications. The Ef-
fective Boundary Conditions must also be the same. There are two ways to 
be sure this criterion is met. If the sets of Event Boundary Conditions 
for each otherwise identical fault event are also identical, a transfer 
can be made. If these Event Boundary Conditions of the events in question 
are not identical, each event must be developed to completion. If, on 
the other hand, the branches of these base events are identical, the de-
sired transfer can be made by leaving one such branch in the fault tree 
while other identical branches are removed with the appropriate transfer 
indicated. If this latter approach is used, the transfer will abbreviate 
the fault tree itself but not its construction time. 
5.6.2 Loops 
A loop exists in a fault tree constructed by STM if event A occurs 
and in the domain of A an event occurs that has the same incident identi-
fication, entity identification, and Effective Boundary Conditions as A. 
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There are two approaches for dealing with this situation: 
(1) Indicate the appropriate transfer back to the first occurrence 
of A from the latter occurrence of A and do not show the development of 
the latter occurrence of A in the fault tree. 
(2) Eliminate the loop situation from the fault tree. 
The first approach perhaps provides a fault tree that gives the 
greatest system management visibility. It is not possible, however, to 
solve the fault tree containing a loop with a computer if the fault tree 
contains such a transfer due to limitations of all present methods of 
locating the minimal cut sets. 
The second approach is easily implemented within the framework 
of STM since, if a loop occurs, the second occurrence of the event is 
simply treated as a Not-allowed Boundary Condition. (See sections 5.2.1 
and 5.2.2.) 
5.6.3 Only One Input to a Gate 
If there is finally only one input to any gate, the logic gate 
type (AND or OR) is immaterial and consequently is not stated. 
CHAPTER VI 
MANUAL FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION USING SYNTHETIC TREE MODEL 
The system chosen for manual fault tree construction using STM 
is the classical fault tree example system that was first presented by 
8 
Haasl in 1965. While this example does not demonstrate every facet of 
STM, it is doubtful any one relatively simply system could, and it does 
present the basic synthesis procedure very well. 
This system is represented by the schematic shown in Figure 8. 
When the switch is closed, power is applied to the timer coil. This 
closes the timer contacts and applies power to the relay coil, which in 
turn closes the relay contacts. Power is then supplied through the fuse 
to the motor. When the switch is opened, the reverse procedure applies. 
The fuse and the timer are safeguards; if the motor fails shorted 
while the relay contacts are closed, then the fuse opens and shuts off 
the power, and if the switch fails to open again after some time (which 
is preset) then the timer will open its contacts and remove power from 
the motor. 
The overheating of the wire is an undesirable event in this 
circyit and it can be prevented if the safeguards operate. 
It is now possible to list the system boundary conditions as 
follows: 
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Figure 8. Schematic for Manual Fault Tree Construction 
Using Synthetic Tree Model 
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TOP Event Overheated wire 
Initial Conditions Relay contacts closed 
rt^TgLmer contacts closed 
Switch closed 
Existing System None 
Boundary Conditions 
Not-allowed System None 
Boundary Conditions 
The TOP event is a First Order Fault Event and therefore must be 
developed to the level of higher order fault events and/or primary events, 
J 
This development is shown in Figure 9 and also appears in Appendix A as 
a catalogued First Order Fault Event. 
It is necessary now to determine the component coalitions. There 
are two series circuit paths in Panel 1, hence two component coalitions, 
while in Panel 2 there is only one component coalition. 
Component Coalition Components 
1 Switch 
Timer Relay Coil 
Power Supply #1 
2 Switch 
Power Supply #1 
Timer Contacts 
Relay Coils 





The failure transfer functions for these components are given in 
Appendix A and will be used as found there. The First Order Fault Event 
generates the following Not-allowed Event Boundary Conditions for gate #1 
(see Section 4.1.1). 
(1) No Current Because of Wire 



















Figure 10. Development Stage Number 1 of Sample Fault 
Tree Construction 
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These boundary conditions will then be Not-allowed Event Boundary Condi-
tions for every gate in the fault tree simce every gate is in the domain 
of the TOP event (see Section 3.4.2). 
It is now possible to proceed with the construction of the fault 
tree. A particular event must be chosen to be developed. 
6.1 Development of the Third Order Fault Event. 
Overload in Wire 
The only component coalition #3 contains the wire; therefore, the 
class of the Third Order Fault Event is immaterial (see Section 5.6.3). 
The fault tree development at this stage then is shown in Figure 10. 
6.2 Development of the Second Order Fault Event, 
Overload in Component Coalition #3 
This Second Order Fault Event can be developed using the component 
failure transfer function of the components in component coalition #3 
(see Section 5.3). The failure transfer function for the fuse must be 
coupled into the tree first since its output logic gate is AND (see Fig-
ure 25). The failure transfer functions of the power supply, motor, and 
wire can be inserted into the fault tree next since both of these com-
ponents can fail to cause the overload (see Figures 2, 27, and 32). This 
development is shown in Figure 11. 
However, recall that "overload because of wire" is a Not-allowed 
Event Boundary Condition; therefore, this failure transfer function must 




Figure 11. Development Stage Number 2 of Sample Fault Tree 
Construction 
Figure 12. Development Stage Number 3 of Sample Fault Tree 
Construction 
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The additional Event Boundary Conditions generated by the Second 
Order Fault Event are the Not-allowedJ|yent Boundary Conditions: 
(1) No current in component coalition #3 (see Section 4.6.2.1) 
(2) No current because of relay contacts (see Section 4.6.2.2) 
(3) No current because of fuse (see Section 4.6.2.2 or Section 
4.6.2.3) 
(4) No current because of power supply (see Section 4.6.2.2 or 
Section 4.6.2.3) 
(5) No current because of motor (see Section 4.6.2.2 or Section 
4.6.2.3). 
These boundary conditions are not Effective Boundary Conditions, 
however, since the domain of the Second Order Fault Event generating the 
boundary conditions contains only primary fault events. This then com-
pletes this branch of the fault tree. 
6.3 Development of the Third Order Fault Event, 
Current in Wire Too Long 
Again only component coalition #3 contains the wire; therefore, 
the Third Order Fault Event development is as shown in Figure 13. If 
the wire had appeared in more than one component coalition, each would 
be connected into the tree with an OR since the class of the Third Order 
Fault Event is II. 
s 
6.4 Development of the Second Order Fault Event, 
Current in Component Coalition #3 Too Long 
The only component in component coalition #3 with a failure trans 
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fer function indicating an output event of current too long is the relay 
contacts. This failure transfer functioa?ds coupled into the fault tree 
as shown in Figure 14. The Second Order Fault Event generates new bound-
ary conditions for its domain. These boundary conditions are coinciden-
tally identical to those for the Second Order Fault Event in Section 6.2. 
6.5 Development of the Fourth Order Fault Event, 
Relay Contacts Held Closed Too Long 
From the schematic it is seen that the relay coil supplies direct 
input to the relay contacts; therefore, the failure transfer function of 
this relay coil indicating holding the contacts closed is used to develop 
the Fourth Order Fault Event (see Section 5.5). The results are shown in 
Figure 15. 
6.6 Development of the Third Order Fault Event, 
Current to Relay Coil Too Long 
The relay coil appears in the component coalition #2 only. The 
development is shown in Figure 16 to be a single Second Order Fault Event, 
current in the component coalition #2 too long (see Section 5.4). 
6.7 Development of the Second Order Fault Event, 
Current in Component Coalition #2 Too Long 
s The appropriate failure transfer functions to develop this Second 
Order Fault Event are one from each of the component's switch and timer 
contacts. Since both output gates for these failure transfer functions 
are AND, order of consideration is not important (see Section 5.3). The 















Figure 15. Development Stage Number 6 of Sample Fault Tree 
Construction 
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Note that the "ordinarily" Fourth Order Fault Event, input to 
switch causes switch to be closed too/ffeong, appears in the diamond symbol 
in the tree. This happens because there is no input to the switch 
in the schematic, hence further development is not possible. 
The new boundary conditions generated by this Second Order Fault 
Event are: 
(1) No current in component coalition #2 
(2) No current because of the relay coil 
(3) No current because of the switch 
(4) No current because of the timer contacts 
(5) No current because of the power supply. 
6.8 Development of the Fourth Order Fault Event, 
Input to Timer Relay Coil Contacts Causes Contacts 
to be Closed Too Long 
From the schematic, it is seen that the timer relay coil supplies 
direct input to the relay contacts. The failure transfer function of the 
timer relay coil is, therefore, used to develop this Fourth Order Fault 
Event (see Section 5.5). The results are in Figure 17. 
This event appears only in the component coalition #1 and, there-
fore, results from current applied too long in component coalition #1 as 
shown in Figure 18. 
6.9 Development of the Second Order Fault Event, 
Current Applied Too Long in Component Coalition #1 























Figure 18. Development Stage Number 9 of Sample Fault Tree 
Construction 
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able to develop this Second Order Fault Event. The results are shown in 
Figure 18. This Second Order Fault Everafc;generates the new Not-allowed 
Event Condition no current in component coalition #1. This boundary con-
dition will never be used, however, since the fault tree is complete. 
Figures 12, 15, 16, and 18 then represent the final system fault 
trees for this example system. This fault tree is shown complete in 
Figure 19. 
Note that a transfer symbol is used in Figure 19. This transfer 
was used only after both affected tree branches were developed to insure 
the effective boundary conditions were the same (see Section 5.6.1). 
The fault tree shown in Figure 19 differs from the one presented 
by Haasl for this system. This is not to claim Haasl's fault tree was 
wrong. It does, however, demonstrate how variations in fault trees can 
occur. It is felt the fault tree constructed using STM does present 
more detail than was presented by Haasl. 
Figure 19. Complete Fault Tree for Sample System 
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CHAPTER VII 
A COMPLETE, AUTOMATED PROBABILISTIC RELIABILITY PREDICTION 
USING SYNTHETIC TREE MODEL 
In order to put forth the position of Synthetic Tree Model, in a 
complete quantitative analysis, such an analysis is presented here for a 
simple, but illustrative, example of a pressure tank system. This is not 
to imply that quantification of fault tree analysis is a necessary ob-
jective. A qualitative analysis often plays the most important role, 
especially in providing feedback to those involved in the system design. 
In addition, there is often considerable uncertainty in the data--that 
is, probabilistic information about the primary event—especially in the 
nuclear industry at this £ime. A quantification of fault tree analysis 
is, however, often desirable to determine the relative, if not absolute, 
reliability of a system. 7 .. 
7.1 Fault Tree Evaluation 
Since the introduction of fault tree analysis, the area receiving 
the most research and development effort has been the evaluation of 
ii i / 0 7 *x.r\ 
fault trees. ' ' The evaluation of a fault tree is obtaining re-
liability information about the TOP event and perhaps the minimal cut-
sets from the data supplied for the failure of the basic components. 
There have been basically three methods for solutions to fault trees pre-
27 31 
sented to date: the direct simulation approach, Monte Carlo methods, 
13 
and direct analytical solutions. 
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The direct simulation approach basically uses Boolean logic hard-
ware similar to that used in digital eomptijters in a one-to-one corres-
pondence with the fault tree Boolean logic to form an analog circuit. 
Immediately this method was seen to be prohibitively expensive. An effort 
was then made to obtain information from the fault tree by a hybrid method 
wherein parts of the solution were obtained using the analog technique 
and parts from a digital calculation in an effort to obtain a costwise 
competitive technique of solution. Because of the expense involved, this 
method has received a relatively small amount of attention. 
Monte Carlo methods are perhaps the most simple in principle but 
in practice becpme outstandingly complex, as is the case with most uses 
of Monte Carlo. Until recently Monte Carlo was, for all practical pur-
poses, the only computational method used for solving complex fault trees. 
Since Monte Carlo is not practical without the use of a digital computer, 
it will be discussed in that framework. 
The most easily understood Monte Carlo technique is called "direct 
M * simulation. Probability data are provided as input and the simulation 
program represents the fault tree on a computer to provide quantitative 
results. In this manner, thousands or millions of trial years of per-
formance can be simulated. A typical simulation program involves the 
following steps: 
* • • 
1. Assign failure data to input fault events within the tree, and 
if desired, repair data. 
The term "simulation" is used in conjunction with Monte Carlo 
methods frequently because Monte Carlo is, indeed, a form of mathematical 
simulation. This should not, however, be confused with the direct analog 
simulation as discussed above. 
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2. Represent the fault tree on a computer to provide quantitative 
results for the overall system performance, subsystem performance, and 
the basic input event performance. 
3. List the failures that lead to the undesired event and identify 
minimal cutsets contributing event results. 
4. Compute and rank basic input failure and availability perform-
ance results. 
In accomplishing these steps, the computer program simulates the 
fault tree and, using the input data, randomly selects the various param-
eter data from assigned statistical distribution parameters, and then 
tests whether or not the specified final event occurred within the speci-
fied time period. Each test is a trial, and a sufficient number of trials 
is run until the desired quantitative resolution is obtained. Each time 
the final event occurs, the contributing effects of input events and the 
logical gates causing the specified final event are stored and listed as 
computer output. The resultant output provides a detailed perspective 
of the system under simulated operating conditions and provides a quanti-
tative basis to support objective decisions. 
The third method of solution is direct analytical solution. To 
illustrate how this might be done for a simple fault tree for static con-
ditions, consider the following example. Consider the fault tree shown 
in figure 20 that contains independent, primary events A, B, C, and D 
with constant probabilities of failure 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4, respec-
tively. This assumption of constant failure probabilities distinguishes 
this example from a realistic fault tree evaluation. The fault tree is, 
however, not in convenient form as shown in Figure 20, because events XI 
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and X2 are not independent since they both are functions of primary event 
B. iy Boolean manipulation the fault trge. shown in Figure 21 is equiva-
lent to the one shown in Figure 20. The fault tree shown in Figure 21 is 
in convenient form for calculating the probability of the TOP event. 
At this time it is necessary to introduce two basic laws of proba-
22 
bility that are used in a fault tree evaluation: 
P ( A I I J A 2 ) = P(A1) + P(A2) - P(Ain A 2> 
P(AiP|A2) = P(A1)P(A2/A1) 
The first law simply states that the probability of a union AIUA2 is 
the sum of the probabilities of the individual events minus the probabil-
ity of their intersection. In terms of the fault tree, the probability 
of a two event OR gate is the sum of probabilities of the two events at-
tached to the gate minus the probability of the two events both occurring. 
The second law states that the probability of an intersection of events 
P(Alp\A2) is equal to the probability of one, P(A1), times the proba-
bility of the other, given the occurrence of the first, P(Al/A2). In 
terms of the fault tree, the probability of a two event AND gate is the 
product of the probabilities of the two attached events, since primary 
events of a fault tree are independent. 
* 
Since all events are independent in the fault tree shown in Figure 
21, unlike the events of the tree shown in Figure 20, the event proba-














Figure 21. Boolean Equivalent of Sample Fault Tree Shown in Figure 3 
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P(Z2) = P(C)P(D) 
P(Z1) = P(B) + P(Z2) ̂ f (B)P(Z2) 
P(TOP) = P(Z1)P(A) 
Upon substitution 
P(TOP) = P(A)P(B) + P(A)P(C)P(D) - P(A)P(B)P(C)P(D) 
P(TOP) =0.0236 
This gives the probability of the system being in the failed state 
constant with respect to time and being 0.0236 for the given primary 
event failure probabilities. Also it is visible from the fault tree 
that the component most crucial to the system is A. This fault tree has 
two critical paths, AB and ACD. Primary event A appears in both critical 
paths. If the probability of event A can be reduced to one half of its 
original value, i.e., from 0.1 to 0.05, the system failure probability is 
reduced to 0.0118, or one half its original value given above. 
In spite of the seeming simplicity of the above example, until 
very recently a practical method for solving complex fault trees analyti-
cally was not known for trees containing primary failures demonstrating 




With the advent of Kinetic Tree Theory in 1970, such analytical 
solutions were possible for complex trees using relatively small amounts 
of computer time. Monte Carlo methods are sometimes used to obtain the 
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critical paths of the fault tree as a prelude to Kinetic Tree Theory. 
31 
The solution of the fault tree itself is%ceomplished through a blend of 
32 
probability theory and differential calculus. Fault trees of any struc-
ture and of any complexity are handled. The use of AND, OR, and INHIBIT 
gates is allowed. General failure and repair distributions are handled; 
there is no limitation to these distributions as in other methodologies. 
Complete probabilistic information is first obtained for each primary 
failure of the fault tree, then for each minimal cutset and finally for 
the TOP failure itself. The information is obtained as a function of time, 
and, hence, with regard to reliability complete kinetic behavior is ob-
tained. The expressions developed are in a simple form, and application 
to yield numerical results is both efficient and straightforward, with an 
average computer time on the order of one minute required for a 500 pri-
13 
mary failure fault tree (on the IBM 360/75 computer). 
As an elementary example of a fault tree solution with failure and 
repair probabilities as functions of time, consider the case of two iden-
tical, independent system units, A and B, operating such that the simul-
taneous failure of both is required to cause system failures as shown in 
the fault tree below. There is then one minimal cut set, AB. 
,<t< 
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LetgF(t) represent the time to failure distribution function. A repair 
facility is used such that the time to repair distribution function is 
represented by G(t). 
F(t) = 1 - e"Xt 
G(t) = 1 - e"^ 
The quantity \ is termed the failure rate for a primary failure while p, is 
termed the repair rate. Both are assumed constant for this example. Let 
q(t) be the probability of the primary failure existing at time t. It has 
33 
been shown that 
4V < X + p. \ + \i 
Now let Q(t) be defined as the probability that the TOP failure exists at 
time t. Since the TOP failure exists at time t if and only if all the 
primary failures exist at time t, 
2 
Q(t) = n q.(t) 
j=l J 
= tq(t)]2 
X 2 - 2 X 2 e - ( ^ ) t + X
2e- 2 ( X^> t 
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The availability of the system A(t) then is given by 
A(t) = 1 - Q(t) 
. V + ftu _X
2e-2^>fc x 2X
2e-^>fc 
(x + M,)2 a + M,)2 a + ^o 2 
It is interesting to note that these are precisely the results ob-
tained in reference 33 for a parallel redundant system configuration using 
the theory of Markov processes. 
7.2 Pressure Tank System Example 
The pressure tank system is shown in Figure 22. The system as 
designed has sufficient controls and interlocks such that the pump pres-
surizes the tank until a preset pressure has been reached or until a cer-
tain time has lapsed. To repeat the pressurization procedure, the reset 
switch must be momentarily closed. There is concern that the pump motor 
might run too long such that the tank becomes over-pressurized and rup-
tures. The pump motor operating too long is then the TOP event for this 
analysis. The timer relay is set such that, when operating properly, 
its contacts open if a preset amount of time lapses--less time than that 
required for the tank to become over-pressurized. The contacts will also 
open if the current is removed from the timer relay coil. 
The pressure switch is designed to open its contacts when a pre-




The availability of the system A(t) then is given by 
. ^ ' ^ • • - . 
A(t) = 1 - Q(t) 
u 2 + 2K» _ X
2 e- 2^> f c 2X2 e " ^ > t 
a + M,)' a + n) + M-) 
It is interesting to note that these are precisely the results ob-
tained in reference 33 for a parallel redundant system configuration using 
the theory of Markov processes. 
7.2 Pressure Tank System Example 
The pressure tank system is shown in Figure 22. The system as 
designed has sufficient controls and interlocks such that the pump pres-
surizes the tank until a preset pressure has been reached or until a cer-
tain time has lapsed. To*repeat the pressurization procedure, the reset 
> 
switch must be momentarily closed. There is concern that the pump motor 
might run too long such that the tank becomes over-pressurized and rup-
tures. The pump motor operating too long is then the TOP event for this 
analysis. The timer relay is set such that, when operating properly, 
its contacts open if a preset amount of time lapses--less time than that 
required for the tank to become over-pressurized. The contacts will also 
open*if the current is removed from the timer1 relay coil. 
The pressure switch is designed to open its contacts when a pre-







Figure 22. Schematic of Pressure Tank System 
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This analysis has three separate stages. 
(1) The construction of the fatffetr *ree. 
(2) The determination of the minimal cut sets for the fault tree. 
(3) The quantitative analysis using these minimal cut sets and 
component probabilistic data. 
Each stage is automated for the analyses given here. The first 
stage uses the computer program DRAFT as presented herein. The second 
uses MOCUS, a program to determine the minimal cut sets as described in 
reference 24. The final stage uses KITT-1, a program exercising Kinetic 
Tree Theory (see Section 2.5), as described in reference 32, to deter-
mine the quantitative aspects of the analysis. 
Step 1--The Use of DRAFT (see Appendix B) 
To prepare the input to DRAFT the schematic is first divided into 
panels as indicated in Figure 22. Components and nodes are numbered as 
shown. The components are assigned the device number corresponding to 
the appropriate library data (see Appendix A). The initial conditions 
are noted to be as follows: 
Incident Entity 
Identification Identification 
contacts closed 2 
contacts closed 9 
contacts closed 10 
contacts closed 7 
contacts open 11 
No events are declared Existing or Not-allowed System Boundary Conditions. 
The contact flag is not used. An input edit of these data is given in 
Table 1. A decoding sheet is given in Table 12. 
The component coalitions are output from DRAFT and are given in 
Table 2 and the fault tree printout is given in Table 3. 
Table 1. DRAFT Input Edit for Pressure Tank System 
NUMBER OF PANELS 3 
Panel Component Component Node Node Input Contact 
Number Number Type One Two Flag Flag 
1 4 40 1 2 0 0 
1 1 30 4 1 0 0 
1 2 50 4 3 5 0 
1 3 10 2 3 0 0 
2 12 40 6 2 0 0 
2 5 70 1 4 0 0 
2 6 80 1 2 0 0 
2 7 50 2 3 6 0 
2 8 70 3 5 0 0 
2 9 50 4 5 13 0 
2 10 50 5 6 8 0 
2 11 50 5 6 0 0 






























4 3 2 1 
12 6 5 9 10 
12 6 5 9 11 
12 7 8 10 
12 7 8 11 
106 13 





Gate 1 (5002 
Gate 2 (1004 
Gate 3 (1004 












Gate 5 (3004 2) OR 
Gate 66 (1004 5) OR 
Gate 7 (1004 102) AND 
Gate 8 (1004 103) AND 
Gate 9 (2004 9) OR 
Gate 10 (2004 10) OR 
Gate 11 (2004 11) OR 
Gate 12 (3004 9) OR 
Gate 13 (3004 10) OR 
















Component ( 2 109) 
Gate 5 








Component (9 109) 
Gate 12 
Component (10 109) 
Gate 13 
Component (11 109) 
Component (11 3004) 
Component (13 109) 
Component (13 3005) 




















Table 3 . Concluded 
Gate Input 













Gate 17 (2004 7) OR Component 
Gate 18 
( 7 109) Circle 10 
Gate 18 (3004 7) OR Component 
Gate 19 
( 6 109) Circle 11 
Gate 19 (2006 6) AND Component 
Gate 20 
( 6 110) Circle 12 
Gate 20 (1004 6) OR Gate 21 
Gate 22 
Gate 21 (1004 102) Gate 9 
Gate 22 (1004 103) AND Gate 11 
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This fault tree is drawn in Figure 23 directly from Table 4. The 
event descriptions are in coded form. A&:entity identification of less 
than 100 indicates a component number while one over 100 indicates a com-
ponent coalition. Other decoding information is available in Table 12. 
The execution time for DRAFT on the UNIVAC 1108 computer was less than 
two seconds. 
It is convenient at this time to point out some effects of the 
boundary condition on the fault tree in Figure 23. During the development 
of gate 15, current too long in component coalition number 104, one might 
expect that contacts number 10 being closed too long would be a fault 
event. However, since these contacts being closed is an initial condi-
tion and current too long in component coalition number 104 indicates 
current to the relay coil associated with contacts number 10, relay con-
tacts number 10 being closed too long is an Existing Event Boundary Con-
dition (see Section 4.6.2.4 and Table 10). Since the event was to be 
connected to an AND gate, the event is simply removed from the tree (see 
Section 5.2.2). Also, since the event descriptions of gates 7 and 22 are 
the same, one might expect a transfer is in order. Upon developing gate 
22 it is found, however, that the Effective Boundary Conditions are not 
the same so the transfer cannot be made. Relay contacts number 10 being 
closed too long is an Effective Event Boundary Condition for gate 22 and 
* 
not gate 7. 
The output from DRAFT shown in Table 3 is modified somewhat to 
provide input to MOCUS. The minimal cut sets are output from MOCUS. 
These are shown in Table 4 and totally represent the fault tree to KITT-1. 
Execution time for MOCUS to locate the 23 minimal cut sets was less than 
92 
| 2004 11 | , | 2004 9 [ n 
Figure 23. Fault Tree for Pressure Tank System 
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Entity ID Incident ID 
2 Power Relay #2 Contacts 
5 Power Relay #2 Coil 
9 Pressure Switch Contacts 
10 Power Relay #1 Contacts 
9 Pressure Switch Contacts 
11 Reset Switch 
13 Pressure Switch Mechanism 
10 Power Relay #1 Contacts 
13 Pressure Switch Sensor Line 
10 Power Relay #1 Contact 
9 Pressure Switch Contacts 
7 Timer Relay Contacts 
9 Pressure Switch Contacts 
8 Power Relay #1 Coil 
13 Pressure Switch Mechanism 
11 Reset Switch 
13 Pressure. Switch Sensor Line 
11 Reset Switch 
9 Pressure Switch Contacts 
11 Reset Switch 
13 Pressure Switch Mechanism 
7 Timer Relay Contacts 
13 Pressure Switch Mechanism 
8 Power Relay Hot Coil 
13 Pressure Switch Sensor Line 
7 Timer Relay Contacts 
13 Pressure Switch Sensor Line 
8 Power Relay #1 Coil 
9 Pressure Switch Contacts 
6 Timer Relay Coil 
13 Pressure Switch Mechanism 











































Entity ID •«'-v 
13 Pressure Switch Sensor Line 
11 Reset Switch 
13 Pressure Switch Mechanism 
6 Timer Relay Coil 
13 Pressure Switch Sensor Line 
6 Timer Relay Coil 
9 Pressure Switch Contacts 
6 Timing Mechanism of Timer Relay 
13 Pressure Switch Mechanism 
6 Timing Mechanism of Timer Relay 
13 Pressure Switch Sensor Line 
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The KITT-1 code obtains numerical probabilities by means of 
13 
Kinetic Tree Theory, a methodology by which exact, time-dependent 
probabilistic information is obtained. In the example presented here, 
only nonrepairability is considered; however, KITT-1 can handle constant 
repair times and exponential repair distributions as well. 
Table 5 displays the primary event failure intensities, also com-
monly called failure rates, input to KITT-1. These constant failure in-
tensities result in exponential failure distributions. 
Figure 24 gives the probability the system is in in the failed 
state as a function of time which is output from KITT.̂ 1. A description 
of other output from KITT-1 is available in reference 32. Run time for 
KITT-1 was less than 12 seconds. The analysis is thereby complete. 
Table 5. Failure Intensities for Components of Pressure Tank System 
Primary Failure Lambda (failures/hour) 
Power Relay #2 Contacts Fail Closed 
Power Relay #2 Coil Fails Closed 
Pressure Switch Contacts Fail Closed 
Pressure Switch Mechanism Fails Closed 
Pressure Switch Sensor Line Fails Plugged 
Power Relay #1 Contacts Fail Closed 
Power Relay #1 Coil Fails Closed 
Reset Switch Fails Closed 
Timer Relay Contacts Fail Closed 
Timer Relay Coil Fails Closed 
Timer Relay Timing Mechanism Fails Slow 
4.5 X 10 
0.5 X 10 
4.5 X 10 
10.5 X 10 
0.1 X 10 
4.5 X 10 
0.5 X 10 
1.0 X 10 
4.5 X 10 
0.5 X 10 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
STM is a formal methodology for fault tree construction that has 
been developed to the point sufficient to allow automated fault tree 
construction to the level of primary failures for certain electrical 
systems. Extension of STM to other types of systems requires the deter-
mination of a sufficient number of values for each of five discrete 
characteristic factors. Some systems may, however, not lend themselves 
to STM since it may not be possible to define events of higher order than 
the First Order Fault Event. Recall that development of a First Order 
Fault Event to a level of higher order fault events is necessary to trig-
ger STM into action. I€ such higher order fault events are not defined, 
the entire fault tree must be developed manually without the aid of STM. 
Indeed, there is no guarantee that the characteristic factors for any 
systems, other than those covered herein, can be determined. 
While all the objectives were attained for STM, certain extensions 
and improvements of STM are recommended. STM should be extended to ac-
count for failure related feedback between components, commonly called 
secondary failures. This requires the use of the inhibit gate as de-
scribed in Chapter II. This extension of STM will involve modifications 
of the transfer functions and possible call for additional ordered fault 
events. Since STM is implemented at this time only for electrical sys-
tems, another extension is the determination of the necessary character-
m m m m m m m m m m m m m m 
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istic factors to allow STM to be applied to various types of systems such 
as^hydraulic and mechanical systems, increasing the resolution of the 
fault trees constructed by STM is accomplished by adding detail to the 
failure transfer functions. This detailing and general broadening of the 
library data is an improvement that is needed if STM is to be applied to 
the complex, dynamic systems encountered in practical reliability studies 
in the nuclear industry and elsewhere. 
Several improvements to the DRAFT program are needed. At present, 
the system given in Appendix C is representative of the largest that DRAFT 
can analyze. This results from only "in-core" computer storage being used. 
The implementation of rapid excess storage into DRAFT is required if the 
program is to be used for industrial systems. Also, the program is not 
programmed to execute in the most efficient manner. An application of 
sophisticated programming techniques is needed to hasten the execution. 
Additional improvements to DRAFT that are recommended are: 
(1) implementing all extensions to STM as they are developed; 
(2) adding error messages to inform the user of mistakes in the 
input data; 
(3) adding the option to allow System Boundary Conditions that 
are effective only after specified events have occurred, that is, condi-
tional system boundary conditions; 
* (4) implementing a method to allow for changes in input data 
without re-execution of the program, that is, "change cases"; 
(5) writing a manual setting forth detailed information on the 
use of DRAFT; and, finally, 
(6) a thorough checking of DRAFT on industrial systems is required. 
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The fault trees resulting from STM are in conventional format, use 
conventional symbols, and are construejfc£d beginning with the main fault 
event of interest and proceeding to the individual component failure as 
is done in conventional fault tree construction. Actually, they differ 
from conventionally constructed fault trees in few ways. They do tend to 
be lengthy as STM uses no "short cuts" in its fault tree construction. 
A main difference is that, should any number of analysts construct fault 
trees independently for a given system and main failure event using STM, 
they will all obtain identical fault trees. This is not a characteristic 
of conventional fault tree construction. 
STM provides an approach for totally automated reliability predic-
tion as shown in Chapter VII. Automated prediction should be thought of 
as a distinct type of approach that could never replace conventional 
fault tree analysis. This automated tool could stop the system analyst 
from thinking. A value of the fault tree technique is that the analyst 
is forced to truly understand the system. Many system weaknesses are 
corrected while constructing the fault tree. A value of the technique 
is thus the construction process as well as the tree itself and resulting 
probability numbers. This automated analysis is a hardware oriented ap-
proach that does not include environmental and human effects that can 
cause failures and, therefore, is apart from a true in-depth fault tree 
analysis. 
This is not to say automated analysis is undesirable; to the con-
trary, when verified on adequately complex systems, automated analysis 
could well become a routine type analysis. It could also provide an ex-
cellent start for a more in-depth fault tree analysis that includes 
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environmental effects, common mode failure, and human errors. The auto-
mated analysis is of course extremely fast and frees the analyst from the 
routine hardware oriented fault tree construction as well as eliminating 
logic errors and errors of oversight in this part of the analysis. Auto-
mated analysis then affords the analyst a powerful tool to allow his prime 
efforts to be devoted to unearthing more subtle aspects of the modes of 
failure of the system. 
While automation of fault tree construction has been accomplished 
using STM, application to manual fault tree construction could provide 
an immediate impact. The technique of STM can be easily and quickly 
learned. In fact, during the 1972 summer quarter, nuclear engineering 
students at the Georgia Institute of Technology who were new to the field 
of reliability analysis demonstrated that, once STM has been observed, 






E.XAMPLE OF LIBRARY DATA OF SYNTHETIC TREE MODEL 
The library data of STM include 
(1) the component failure transfer functions 
(2) the class of the Third Order Fault Event 
(3) the category of the Second Order Fault Event 
(4) the Inter-Correlation between the Second Order Fault Events 
and the Boundary Conditions 
(5) Library of First Order Fault Events developed to higher order 
fault events. 
The library need not contain all possible values of these parameters but 
only a sufficient number to construct fault trees for systems in question, 
A listing of such sufficient library data will be provided here. The 
listing is, in fact, sufficient for construction of all fault trees ap-
pearing in this dissertation. 
Components Failure Transfer Functions 
Figures 25 through 33 display the failure transfer function li-
brary data for the following components. 
t 
Components Device No. 
fuse 10 
electric motor 30 
power supply 40 
contacts 50 












The "D" above Boolean logic diagrams indicates the discriminator 
value. 
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Figure 25. Failure Transfer Functions for a Fuse 
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Figure 26. Failure Transfer Functions for an Electric Motor 
106 
NO CURRENT » 
(OTHER I 







P N O CURRENT ~1 
TOO LONG I 
|(QTHER REASONSij 
Figure 27. Failure Transfer Functions for a Power Supply 
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Figure 29. Failure Transfer Functions for a Circuit Breaker Coil 
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Figure 31. Failure Transfer Functions for a Timer Relay Coil 
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Figure 32. Fai lure Transfer Functions for Wiring 
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Figure 33. Failure Transfer Functions for a Pressure Switch 
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Table 6. Class of the Third Order Fault Event Library Data 
Class I 
No Current 
No Current Too Long 
-Class II 
Current 
Current Too Long 
Overload 








Current Too Long 
Table 8. Inter-Correlation Between Second Order Fault Events 
and Boundary Condition Library Data 
Type 1 Second Order Fault Event Boundary Condition 
The Occurrence of This 
Fault Event in a GiVen 
Component Coalition 
No Current 
No Current Too Long 
Current 
Current Too Long 
Overload 
Generates These Not-allowed 
Event Boundary Conditions for 
the Same Component Coalition 
Current 
Current Too Long 
Overload 
Current 
Current Too Long 
Overload 
No Current 
No Current Too Long 
No Current 
No Current Too Long 
No Current 
No Current Too Long 
Table 9. Inter-Correlation Between Second Order Fault Events 
and Boundary Condition Library Data 
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Type 2 Second Order Fault Event Boundary Condition 
The Occurrence of This 
Fault Event in a Given 
Component Coalition 
Current 
Current Too Long 
Overload 
Generates the Transfer Function of 
Every Component in the Component 
Coalition with These Output Events, 
if any, as Not-allowed Event Bound-
ary Conditions  
No Current 
No Current Too Long 
No Current 
No Current Too Long 
No Current 
No Current Too Long 
In spite of the similarities of this Not-allowed Event 
Boundary Condition generation to those of Type 1 Second Order 
Fault Event Boundary Condition generation, they are different 
since a component can appear in many component coalitions. 
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Table 10. Inter-Correlation Between Second^Order Fault Events 
and Boundary Condition Library Data 
Type 4 Second Order Fault Event Boundary Condition 
Events Initial Conditions (Y) 
^ ' Relay Coil Circuit Breaker Coil 
Contacts Contacts Contacts Contacts 
Open Closed Open Closed 
current in any com-
ponent coalitions 
containing the coil 
no current in every 
component coalition 
containing the coil 




no current too long 





containing the coil 
For the transfer functions presented here the only Existing Event 
Boundary Condition generation concerns the relay coil and circuit 
breaker coil. 
This chart is interpreted as follows. Given initial condition, Y, 
the occurrence of Second Order Fault Events, X, gives rise to the Existing 
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Figure 34. First Order Fault Event Development 
for Overheated Wire 
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Figure 35. First Order Fault Event Development 
for Motor Operating Too Long 
APPENDIX B 
BASIC DESCRIPTION OF DRAFT 
DRAFT is a computer program that constructs hardware oriented 
fault trees for electrical systems to the level of primary failures. 
DRAFT exercises STM. The input consists of the system schematic and the 
system boundary conditions. The availability of library data similar 
to those shown in Appendix A is assumed in coded form. 
DRAFT was written for the UNIVAC 1108 computer and will construct 
a fault tree with 100 gates in typically less than seven seconds. Stor-
age requirements are a limiting factor in the application of DRAFT be-
cause of the extensive, necessary bookkeeping associated with the Event 
Boundary Conditions. At this time, all storage and calculations are done 
in the 65,000 decimal words of core of the UNIVAC 1108. The fault tree 
example given in Appendix C is typically the largest that can, thereby, 
be constructed by DRAFT at this time. 
While it is hot the purpose of this thesis to present a computer 
code suitable for industrial applications, indeed such a code has not 
been developed, the program does verify that STM is formal and does af-
ford a non-intuitive analyst, the UNIVAC 1108, to apply the model. 
* 
Input 
The electrical schematic must be prepared for input to DRAFT. 
Each component is given a unique number and is correlated to an item in 
the library which already has a unique number (see Appendix A). The 
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schematic is divided into panels. A component that does not receive 
electrical power, such as a mechanical pressure switch, must be in a 
panel by itself. No two panels can have common wiring; therefore, a com-
ponent can appear in component coalitions of only one panel. Each panel 
must have one and may have more than one power supply. There can be 
interfacing between panels by coupling between one or more components. 
There can also be such interplay within a given panel. The component 
coalitions are independent of the mechanical interplay (see Sections 
4.3.1 and 4.3.2). 
The components of each panel are separated by a minimum number of 
uniquely numbered nodes. The interplay between components is correlated 
by noting the component number of component A from which component B re-
ceives input. 
A contact flag can also be input, indicating if a switch is to be 
always open. This is useful"for masking out certain portions of a system 
for a given analysis. 
The System Boundary Conditions are then input in coded form. The 
code has two parts, the incident identification and the entity identifi-
cation. The incident identification is coded to describe the event while 
the entity identification is simply the component number. 
These System Boundary Conditions include the TOP event, the ini-
tial conditions, and events that are declared to be existing or not-
allowed boundary conditions during the duration of the fault tree con-
struction. This concludes the input description to DRAFT. An actual 
input edit is given in Table 11 for the system analyzed manually in 
Chapter VII. A decoding list is given in Table 12. 
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Table 11. Example Inp ut Edit for DRAFr r 
NUMBER OF PANELS 3 
Panel Component Component Node Node Input Contact 
Number Number Type One Two Flag Flag 
1 2 40 1 2 0 0 
1 3 90 5 1 0 0 
1 1 10 2 3 0 0 
1 4 30 4 5 0 0 
1 5 50 4 3 7 0 
2 10 40 8 9 0 0 
2 6 50 6 7 8 0 
2 7 70 8 6 0 0 
2 8 80 8 7 0 0 







Table 12. Decoding List for Incident Identification 
Code Number Description 
For First Order Fault Events 
For Second Order Fault Events and 
Third Order Fault Events 
For Fourth Order Fault Events 


































Device operates too long 
No current 
No current too long 
Current 
Current too long 
Overload 
Input holds device open 
Input holds device open too long 
Input holds device closed 
Input holds device closed too long 
Input to detector fails to reach detector 
Contacts open 
Contacts open too long tp 
Contacts closed 
Contacts closed too long 
Dummy identifications 
Fuse opens 
Fuse fails to open 
Device fails to perform as designed 
Device open circuits 
Device short circuits 
Power supply fails (OFF) 
Power supply surges 
Device fails open 
Device fails closed 
Device defects cause failure 
Timer overrun 







Output from DRAFT includes a description of the component coalitions ! 
and the constructed fault tree. The event descriptions are in coded form 
and are also decoded using Table 12. The output for the system analyzed 
manually in Chapter VTI is given in Tables 13 and 14. The form of the 
output fault tree is a conventional fault tree representation. The first 
gate is the TOP event and logic gate with the inputs to the gate are pro-
vided. These inputs can be gates or primary events. The graphical fault 
tree representation is directly implied by this output. It is convenient 
to draw the fault tree manually directly from this output. Entity iden-
tification of oVer 100 are component coalition numbers while those under f 
k 
100 indicate component numbers. 
Routine 
DRAFT executes basically in a manner described by the diagram , ! 
' )• 
shown as Figure 36. j 
Table 13. Example of Component Coalition 











101 2 1 5 4 3 
102 
103 
10 9 6 7 
10 9 8 
, lllli 













e 2 (2500 3) 
e 3 (1004 3) 
e 4, (1005 3) 
e 5 (1004 101) 
e 6 (1005 101) 
e 7 (2004 5) 
e 8 (2600 0) 
e 9 (3004 5) 
e 10 (1004 7) 
e 11 (1004 102) 
e 12 (2004 9) 
e 13 (2004 6) 
e 14 (3004 6) 
e 15 (2006 8) 
e 16 (1004 8) 


































Component ( 1 102) 
Gate 8 
Component ( 5 109) 
Gate 9 
Component ( 2 107) 
Component (4 105) 





Component ( 9 109) 
Component ( 9 3004) 
Component ( 6 109) 
Gate 14 
Component ( 8 109) 
Gate 15 




































Figure 36. Diagram of Procedure of DRAFT 
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APPENDIX C 
EXAMPLE OF FAULT TREE CONSTRUCTION FOR A REACTOR 
SCRAM SYSTEM USING DRAFT 
As a final, and somewhat more involved, example of the DRAFT code, 
a reactor trip system is chosen. The schematic for this system is shown 
in Figure 37. 
A pressure is sensed by three pressure detectors, components 55, 
56, and 57. During normal operation the pressure is below the setpoint 
and the detector contacts are open. If the pressure exceeds the set-
point, each alarm unit supplies current connections to energize two con-
trol relays (for example, detector 55 closes contacts 37 resulting in 
alarm unit 35 closing contacts 32 that in turn result in relay coils 33 
and 34 closing contacts 25 and 13, respectively). Contacts of the relay 
coils in panels 4, 5, and 6 arranged in two sets (panels 2 and 3) of 
two-out-of-three logic, energize relay coils 15, 16, 27, and 28. These 
in turn close contacts 11, 12, 23, and 24, respectively, causing circuit 
breaker coils 17, 18, 29, and 30 to open contacts 3, 4, 2, and 5, respec-
tively. The power is, thereby, removed from the control rod drive motor 
and the*control rods fall by gravity into the core. The trip action is 
then complete. The TOP event is the control rod motor operating when 
it should not. That is, the failure is the control rod motor operating. 
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Figure 37. Schematic of Reactor Scram System Example 
mmmmmm 
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Figure 37. Concluded 
It is interesting to note that this explanation of system design 
intent is'not necessary to construct the system fault tree when using 
DRAFT. 
The panel and node layout is also given in Figure 37. The input 
edit from DRAFT is given in Table 15 and the component coalitions are 
given in Table 16. The fault tree output from DRAFT is given in Table 
17. This output is drawn into a fault tree in Figure 38. 
The construction of this fault tree is typical of the largest 
fault tree DRAFT can construct at present on the UNIVAC 1108 at the 
Georgia Institute of Technology due to storage requirements. No out of 
core storage is used, however. 
/ 
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Table 15. Concluded 
Panel Component Component Node $d"fe Input Contact 
Number Number Type One Two Flag Flag 
5 39 40 1 2 0 0 
5 40 50 2 3 43 0 
5 41 70 1 3 0 0 
5 42 70 1 3 0 0 
5 43 70 2 4 0 0 
5 44 90 4 5 0 0 
5 45 50 5 6 56 0 
5 46 50 6 1 0 0 
6 47 40 1 2 0 0 
6 48 50 2 3 51 0 
6 49 70 1 3 0 0 
6 50 70 1 3 0 0 
6 51 70 2 4 0 0 
6 52 90 4 5 0 0 
6 53 50 5 6 57 0 
6 54 50 6 1 0 0 
7 55 100 1 2 0 0 
8 56 100 1 2 0 0 
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Table 16. Component Coalitions for Reactor Scram System 
Component Coalitions 
Panel Number Component Coalition Component Number 
Number 
1 101 1 6 3 2 
1 102 1 6 5 4 
2 103 7 11 17 
2 104 7 12 17 
2 105 7 8 13 15 
2 106 7 8 13 16 
2 107 7 9 13 15 
2 108 7 9 13 16 
2 109 7 10 14 15 
2 110 7 10 14 16 
2 111 7 11 18 
2 112 7 12 18 
3 113 19 23 29 
3 114 19 24 29 
3 115 19 20 25 27 
3 116 19 20 25 28 
3 117 19 21 25 27 
3 118* 19 21 25 28 
3 119 19 22 26 27 
3 120 19 22 26 28 
3 121 19 23 30 
3 122 19 24 30 
4 123 31 32 33 
4 124 31 35 36 37 
4 125 31 32 34 
5 126 39 40 41 
5 127 39 43 44 45 
5 128 39 40 42 
6 129 47 48 49 
6 ' 130 47 • 51 52 53 
6 131 47 48 50 
7 132 55 
8 133 56 
9 134 57 













Gate 2 (1003 101) 
Gate 3 (1003 102) 
Gate 4 (2003 3) 
Gate 5 (2003 2) 
Gate 6 (2003 5) 
Gate 7 (2003 4) 
Gate 8 (3003 3) 
Gate 9 (3003 2) 
Gate 10 (3003 5) 
Gate 11 (3003 4) 
Gate 12 (1001 17) 
Gate 13 (1001 29) 
Gate 14 (1001 30) 
Gate Input 



















AND Gate 4 
Gate 5 
AND Gate 6 
Gate 7 
OR Component ( 3 
Gate 8 
109) 
OR Component ( 2 
Gate 9 
109) 
OR Component ( 5 
Gate 10 
109) 
OR Component ( 4 
Gate 11 
109) 
OR Component (17 
Gate 12 
109) 
OR Component (29 
Gate 13 
109) 
OR Component (30 
Gate 14 
109) 
OR Component (18 
Gate 15 
109) 
AND Gate 16 
Gate 17 
AND Gate 18 
Gate 19 
















Table 17. Continued 
Incident Entity 
I D* * I D* 
Gate 15 (1001 18) 
Gate 16 (1001 103) 
Gate 17 (1001 104) 
Gate 18 (1001 113) 
Gate 19 (1001 114) 
Gate 20 (1001 121) 
Gate 21 (1001.122) 
Gate 22 (1001 111) 
Gate 23 (1001 112) 

























Component ( 7 
Gate 24 
Component (17 















Component ( 7 
Gate 24 
Component (18 

























































Gate 25 (2001 12) 
Gate 26 (2001 23) 
Gate 27 (2001 24) 
Gate 28 (3001 11) 
Gate 29 (3001 12) 
Gate 30 (3001 23) 
Gate 31 (3001 24) 












Gate 33 (1001 16) AND 
Gate 34 (1001 27) AND 
Gate 35 (1001 28) AND 
Gate 36 (1001 105) OR 











Component (12 108) 
Gate 29 
Component (23 108) 
Gate 30 
Component (24 108) 
Gate 31 
Component (15 108) 
Gate 32 
Component (16 108) 
Gate 33 
Component (27 108) 
Gate 34 














Component ( 7 106) 
Gate 48 
Gate 49 

























Gate 38 (1001 109) OR 
Gate 39 (1001 106) OR 
Gate 40 (1001 110) OR 
Gate 41 (1001 110) OR 
Gate 42 (1001 115) OR 










Component C 7 106) 
Gate 50 
Gate 49 
Component (15 104) 
Component \ C 7 106) 
Gate 51 
Gate 52 
Component (15 104) 
Component C 7 106) 
Gate 48 
Gate 49 
Component (16 104) 
Component ( 7 106) 
Gate 50 
Gate 49 
Component (16 104) 
Component ( 7 106) 
Gate 51 
Gate 52 
Component (16 104) 
Component \ (19 106) 
Gate 53 
Gate 54 
Component (27 104) 
Component (19 106) 
Gate 55 
Gate 54 





















* fc * 
Gate 44 (1001 119) 
Gate 45 (1001 116) 
Gate 46 (1001 118) 
Gate 47 (1001 120) 
Gate 48 (2001 8) 
Gate 49 (2001 13) 
Gate 50 (2001 9) 
Gate 51 (2001 10) 
Gate 52 (2001 14) 
Gate 53 (2001 20) 









Component (19 106) 
Gate 56 
Gate 57 
Component (27 104) 
Component (19 106) 
Gate 53 
Gate 54 
Component (28 104) 
Component (19 106) 
Gate 55 
Gate 54 
Component (28 104) 
Component (19 106) 
Gate 56 
Gate 57 
Component (28 104) 
Component ( 8 108) 
Gate 58 
Component (13 108) 
Gate 59 
Component ( 9 108) 
Gate 60 
Component (10 108) 
Gate 61 
Component (14 108) 
Gate 62 
Component (20 108) 
Gate 63 
























Gate 55 (2001 
Gate 56 (2001 
Gate 57 (2001 
Gate 58 (3001 
Gate 59 (3001 
Gate 60 (3001 
Gate 61 (3001 
Gate 62 (3001 
Gate 63 (3001 
Gate 64 (3001 
Gate 65 (3001 
Gate 66 (3001 
Gate 67 (3001 
Gate 68 (1001 
Gate 69 (1001 

















































































































ID* ID* T™e 
* ** * 
Gate 71 (1001 50) 
Gate 72 (1001 42) 
Gate 73 (1001 49) 
Gate 74 (1001 33) 
Gate 75 (1001 41) 
Gate 76 (1001 49) 
Gate 77 (1001 41) 
Gate 78 (1001 131) OR 
Gate 79 (1001 125) OR 
Gate 80 (1001 128) OR 
Gate 81 (1001 131) OR 
Gate 82 (1001 128) OR 
Gate 83 (1001 129) OR 





































































Incident Entity Gate 








Gate 98 (1001 124) OR 
Gate 99 (1001 127) OR 
Gate 100(2001 53) OR 
Gate 101(2001 54) OR 
Gate 102(2001 37) OR 
Gate 103(2001 38) OR 
Gate 104(2001 45) OR 
Gate 105(2001 46) OR 
Gate 106(3001 53) OR 
Gate 107(3001 37) OR 













































































































CONTACTS # 4 
HELD CLOSED 
K. 
NO CURRENT TO 
CIRCUIT BREAK-
ER » IB 
a NO CURRENT IN| 
COMPONENT CO-
AT.TTTON * 1 H 
NO CURRENT IN 
COMPONENT CO-
AT.TTTnN * 114 
NO CURRENT IN 
COMPONENT CO-
ALITION # 1 1 1 
NO CURRENT IN 
COMPONENT CO-
ALITION # 1 1 2 
Figure 38. Fault Tree for Reactor Scram System 
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CONTACTS # 3 
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s NO CURRENT TO 
CIRCUIT BREAK-




ICOIL # 17 
FAILS 
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ALITION • 103 
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HELD OPEN 
_£_ 
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IN C.C. # 107 
NO CURRENT 
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NO CURRENT 
IN C.C. # 106 
NO CURRENT 
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NO CURRENT 
IN C.C. # 110 
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Figure 38. Continued 
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CONTACTS # 5 
CLOSED 
CONTACTS # 5 
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COIL # 30 
VFAILS OPEN; 
.CIRCUIT 
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NO CURRENT 
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Ui 
NO CURRENT 
IN C.C. # 115 
NO CURRENT 
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CONTACTS # 24 
HELD OPEN 
NO CURRENT TO 
RELAY COIL #28 
NO CURRENT 
IN C.C. # 116 
NO CURRENT 
IN C.C. # 118 
NO CURRENT 
IN C.C. #. 120 
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CONTACTS # 20 
HELD OPEN 
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RELAY COIL #4< 
NO CURRENT IN 
COMPONENT CO-
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OPEN 
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Figure 38. Continued 
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Figure 38. Continued 
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Figure 38. Continued 
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Figure 38 . Continued 
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